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Abstract 
The processes whereby our brains continue to learn about a changing world in a sta-
ble fashion throughout life are proposed to lead to conscious experiences. These processes 
include the learning of top-down expectations, the rnatching of these expectations against 
bottom-up data, the focusing of attention upon the expected clusters of information, and the 
development of resonant states between bottom-up and top-clown processes as they reach 
an attentive consensus between what is expected and what is there in the outside world. 
It is suggested that all conscious states in the brain are resonant states, and that these 
resonant states trigger learning of sensory and cognitive representations. T'he rnoclcls which 
sunnnari~e these concepts arc therefore called Adaptive Resonance 'J'heory, or ARJ', models. 
Psychophysical and neurobiological data in support of AHT are presented from early vision, 
visual object recognition, auditory streaming, variable-rate speech perception, somatosen-
sory perception, and cognitive-emotional interactions, among others. It is noted that Altr 
nrccha.nisrns seem to be operative at all levels of the visual system, and it is proposed how 
these mechanisms are rca.li~ecl by known laminar circuits of visual cortex. It is predicted 
tha.L the sarne circuit realiz,a.tion of AHT rnccha.nisms will be found in the laminar circuits 
of all sensory and cognitive neocortex. Concepts and data are sumnmrized concerning how 
0ome visual percepts rna.y be visibly, or rnodally, perceived, whereas amodal percepts rna.y be 
consciously recogni~ed even though they a.rc perceptually invisible. It is a.lw suggeBted tha.t. 
sensory a.nd cognitive processing in the What processing stream of tbc brain obey top-down 
rnatching and learning laws that are often complerncntary to those used for spatial and rnotor 
processing in the brain's Where processing strcarn. 'fhis enables our sensory and cognitive 
representations to rnainta.in their stability as we learn more about the world, while allowing 
spa.t.ial and rnotor representations to forget learned maps and gains that are no longer appro-
priate a.s our bodies develop a.nd grow from infanthood to adulthood. Procedural memories 
are proposed to be unconscious because the inhibitory matching process that support.B these 
spatial and motor processes cannot lead to rewna.nce. 
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How Do We Continue to Learn Throughout Life? 
We experience the world as a whole. Although myriad signals relentlessly bombard 
our senses, we somehow integrate them into uniftecl moments of conscious experience that 
cohere together despite their diversity. Because of the apparent unity and coherence of our 
awareness, we can develop a sense of self that can gradually mature with our experiences of 
the world. 'I'his capacity lies a.t the heart of our ability to function as intelligent beings. 
'l'he apparent unity and coherence of our experiences is all the more remarkable when 
we consider several propertiet: of how the brain copes with the environmental eventt: that it 
processes. First and foremot:t, these events are highly context-sensitive. When we look at a 
complex picture or scene as a. whole, we can often recognize its objects and its meaning at a 
glance, at: in the picture of a familiar face. However, if we process the face piece-by-piece, as 
through a srnall aperture, then itt: significance may be greatly degraded. 'l'o cope with this 
context-sensitivity, the brain typically processes pictures and other sense data in parallel, as 
pidtcrns of activation across a large number of feature-sen:;itivc nerve cells, or neurons. 'I'he 
sarne is true for senses other than vision, such as audition. H the sound of the word GO 
is altered by clipping off the vowel 0, then the consonant G may sound like a chirp, quite 
unlike its sound at: part of GO. 
During vision, all the signals from a scene typica.lly reach the photosensitive retinas of the 
eyes at essentially the same tirne, so parallel processing of all the scene's parts begins at the 
retina, itself. During audition, each successive t:ormcl reaches the ear at a later time. Before 
an entire pattern of sounds, such as the word GO, can be processed as a whole, it need;; 
to be rccoclecl, at it hrter processing t:tage, into a simultaneously available spatial pattern of 
activation. Such it processing stage is often called a working memory, ami the activations 
that it stores crrc often called short term memory (S'I'M) traces. For example, when you hear 
an unfa.rniliar telephone number, you can temporarily store it; in working memory while you 
walk over to the telephone and dial the number. 
ln order to dctcnnine which of theoc patterns representt: familiar events and which do 
not, the brain matcher; these pattcrno againot ;;tored representationo of previouo expcrimrccs 
that have been acquired through learning, Unlike the S'I'M traces that arc stored in a 
working rnernory, the lccrrnccl experiences are :otorecl in long term rnemory (I:I'M) traces. 
One difference between S'I'M and r:rM traces concerno how they react to diotractions. For 
exarnple, if you arc distracted by a loud noi;;c before you dial a new telephone number, it;; 
S'l'M representation can be rapidly reset so that you forget it. On the Olher hand, if you are 
distracted by a loud noise, you (hopefully) will not forget the L'I'lvl reprcoentation of your 
own na.rnc. 
'I'he problern of learning nrakcs the unity of conscious experience particularly hard to 
understand, if only because we are able to rapidly learn such enormous amounts of new 
inforrnation, on our own, throughout life. For exanrple, after seeing an exciting rnovic, we 
can tell our friends rnany details about it later on, even though the individual scenes flashed 
by very quickly. More generally, we can quickly learn about new cnvironrnent.s, even if no 
one tells ut: how the rules of each environrnent differ. 'I'o a surprising degree, we can rapidly 
learn new facts without being forced to just as rapidly forget what we already know. As a 
result, we do not need to a,voicl going out into the world for fear that, in learning to recognize 
a new friend's face, we will suddenly forget our parents' faces. 
Many contemporary learning algorithms would not be so lucky! Speaking technically, 
the brain solves a very hard problem that many current approaches to technology have not 
solved. It is a self-organizing system that is capable of rapid yet stable autonomous learning 
of huge amounts of data in a nonstationary environment. Discovering the brain's solution 
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to this key problem is as important for understanding our;;elves as it is for developing new 
pattern recognition and prediction applications in technology. 
l have called the problem whereby the brain learns quickly and stably without catastroph-
ically forgetting its past knowledge the sta.bility-pla.sUchy dilemnn The stability-plasticity 
dilemma. must be solved by every brain system that needs to rapidly and a.daptively respond 
to the flood of signals that subservcs even the most ordinary experiences. If the brain's 
design is parsimonious, then we should expect to find sirnila.r design principles operating in 
all the brain systems that can stably learn an accumulating knowledge base in response to 
changing conditions throughout life. The discovery of such principles should clarify how the 
brain unifies diverse sources of information into coherent moments of conscious experience. 
Thi;; article reviews evidence that the brain does operate in this way. It summarizes 
several recent brain modeling studies that illustrate, and further develop, a theory called 
Adaptive Resonance T'heory, or ART', that I introduced in 1976 (Grossberg, 1976a, 1976b, 
1978, 1980, 1982). ln the present article, l will briefly summarize results selected from four 
areas where AKI' principles have been used to explain challenging behavioral and brain data. 
'I'hese areas are visual perception, visual object recognition, auditory source identification, 
and variable-rate speech recognition. On first inspection, the behavioral properties of these 
visna.l and auditory phenomena may seem to be entirely unrelated. On a deeper compu-
tational level, their governing neural circuits arc proposed to incorporate a. similar set of 
comput.at.ional principles. 
l should also say right away, however, that An:r principles do not seern to be used in all 
brain learning systc.ms. Whereas AK!' learning designs help to explain sensory and cognitive 
processes such a.s perception, recognition, attention, reinforcement., recall, working memory, 
and memory search, other types of learning seem to govern spatial and motor processes. 
In these latter task domains, it is adaptive to forget old coordinate transformations as the 
brain's control systems adjust to a growing body and to other changes in the body's sensory-
rnotor endowment throughout life. 
Sensory and cognitive proccs:oes arc often a.;;:oocia.tecl with the What cortical proces:o·· 
ing strearn that passe;; frorn vic;ual cortex through infcroternporal cortex, whcrca0 spatial 
and motor processes are associated with the Where (or llow) cortical processing strearn 
that passes from vi:oual cortex through parietal cortex (Goodale and Milner, 1992; Mi:ohkin, 
Ungcrlciclcr, and Macko, 198~); Ungcrlcidcr and Mishkin, 1982). Our research over the ycms 
has concluded that rnany processe0 in the two distinct :otreams, notably their matching and 
learning processes, obey different, and even cornplenrcnta.ry, laws. T'his fact bears heavily on 
questions of consciou;;ness, a.nd helps to explain why procedural memories are not conscious 
(Cohen and Squire, 1980; Mishkin, 1982; Scoville and Milner, HJ57; Squire and Cohen, 19811). 
Indeed, a central hypothesis of AH'I' since its inception is 
ART Hypothesis: All conscious states a.rc resonant states. 
As noted in greater detail below, rnany spatial and n1otor proccs;;cs involve a form of' 
inhibitory matching and misrna.tch··l:nlsed learning that docs not support resonant ;;tat.es. 
Hence, by the AH1' Hypothesis, they cannot support a conscious state. Although An:r pre-
dicts that all conscious states are resonant states, the converse statement, that all resonant 
;;tate;; are conscious states, is not yet asserted. 
lt rnight be worthwhile to note immediately that various other moclel:o of cognitive learn-
ing and recognition, such as the popula.r backpropagation model (Parker, 1982; Rurnelhart, 
Hinton, ami Williams, 1986; Werbos, 1974), are based on i\ form of mismatch-based learning. 
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'I'hey cannot, therefore, generate resonant states and, in fact, arc well known to experience 
catastrophic forgetting under real-time learning conditions. A compa.ra.tive survey of Aitr 
vs. backpropagation computational properties is provided in Grossberg (1988). 
The Theoretical Method 
Another point worth noting is how one arrives at a. psychophysiologica.l theory such a.s 
ART' which atternpts to link behavioral properties to the brain mechanisms which generate 
them. Such a linkage between brain and behavior is, I believe, crucial in any mature theory 
of consciousness, since a. theory of consciousness that cannot explain behavioral data. has 
failed to clea.l with the contents of consciousness, and a. theory of consciousness that cannot 
link behaviors to the brain mechanisms from which they emerge must remain, at best, a 
metaphor. 
A particular type of theoretical method has been elaborated over the past thirty years 
with which to approach such complex behavioral and brain phenomena. 'I'he key is to 
begin with behavioral data, typically scores or even hundreds of parametrically structured 
behavioral experirncnts in a particular problern domain. One begins with behavioral data 
because the brain has evolved in order to achieve behavioral success. Any theory that. 
hopes to link brain to behavior thus needs to discover the computationa.l level on which 
brain dynamics control behavioral success. One works with large amounts of data because 
otherwise too many seemingly plausible hypotheses cannot be ruled out. 
A crucial nretatheoretical constraint is to insist upon understanding the behavioral data. 
which comes to us as static numbers or curves on a page ··· as the emergent properties 
of a dynamical process which is taking place nroment-by-rnoment in an individual mind. 
One also needs to respect the fact that our nrinds can adapt on their own to changing 
environm.cntal conditions without being told that these conditions have changed. One thus 
needs to frontally attack the problem of how an intelligent being can autonomously adapt, 
to a. cha.nging world. Knowing how to clo this is presently an art forrn. 'I'here are no known 
algorithrns with which to point the way. 
Whenever we have a.tternptcd this task in Ure past, we have resisted every ternptat.ion 
t.o usc honrunculi, or else the crucial constraint. on a.u(onoJnous adaptation would be vi-
olated. The result ha.s regularly been the discovery of new organint.ional principles a.rrd 
rnechaniBms, which we have then realized as a minimal rnodcl operating according to only 
locally cldined laws t.hat arc capable of operating on their own in real time. 'I'he remarkable 
fact. is that., when such a rnodel has been written down, it has always been interpretable as 
a neural network. 'fhcse neural networks have always included known bra,in mechanisms. 
The functional intcrprcl.at.ion of these rnechanisms has, however, often been novel because 
of the light thrown upon them by the behavioral analysis. 'I'he networks !rave also typi-
cally predicted the existence of unknown neural mechanisms, and many of these predictions 
have been supported by subsequent neurophysiological, anatomical, and even biochemical 
experirnents ovr)r the years. Once this neural connect.ion has been established by a top-clown 
analysis, one can work both top-down from behavior and bottom-up frorn brain to exert a 
tremendous amount of conceptual pressure with which to better characterize and refine the 
rnodel. A fundamenta.l ernpirical conclusion can be drawn from many experiences of tlris 
type; narncly, the brain as we know it ca.n be successfully understood as an organ t.hat is 
designed to achieve successful a.utonornous adaptation to a changing world. I like to say that., 
although 1 arrr known as one of the founders of the field of neural net. works, I have never tried 
to derive a. neural network. 'l'hey arc there because they provide a natura.! comput.ationa.l 
frarnework with which to control a.utonon1ous behavioral adaptation to a changing world. 
Such a. real-time analysis is not easy because it. requires that one have knowledge, and 
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even mastery, of several disciplines. For example, it has always proved to be the case that the 
level of brain organization that computes behavioral success is the network or system level. 
Does this mean that individual nerve cells, or even smaller components, are unimportant'! 
Not at alJI One needs to properly define the inc\iviclual nerve cells and their intera.ctiono in 
order to correctly define the networks and sy:-;tems whose interactive, or emergent, propertie:-; 
map onto behavior as we know it. Thus one must be able to freely move between (at lea:-;t) 
the three levels of Neuron, Network, and Behavior in order to complete such a theoretical 
cycle. 
Doing this requires tha.t one ha.s a. sufficient.ly powerful theoretical la.ngua.ge. The lan-
guage of rnathcmatics h<ts proved to be the relevant tool, indeed a particular kind of math-
ematics. All of the self-ada.pting behavioral ancl brain systems that I have ever derived are 
nonlinear feedback systems with large numbers of components operating over rnultiple spa-
tial a.ncl temporal sca.lcs. The nonlinearity just means that our 1ninds are not the sum of 
their parts. 'I'hc feedback means that interactions occur in both directions within the brain, 
and between the brain and its environment. The multiple temporal scales are there because, 
for example, processes like STM are faster than the processes of learning and r:rM. Multiple 
spatial scales are there because the brain needs to process pMts as well as wholes. All of 
this is very easy to say intuitively. But when one needs to work within the tough honesty 
of 1na.thernatics, things are not so easy. Most of the difficulties that people seem to ha.ve 
in understanding what is already theoretically known about such systems derives from a 
literacy problem in which at least one, but. often more than one, of the ingredients of neuron, 
network, behavior, and nonlinear feedback mathematics are not farniliar to them. 
A second important rneta.thcorctica.l constraint derives from the fa.ct. that no single step 
of theoretical derivation can derive a. whole brain. One needs to have a. method that can 
evolve with the cornplexity of the environmental challenges thai. the rnodel is forced to face. 
'I'his is accomplished as follows. After introducing a. dynamical model of a. prescribed set of 
data., one analyses its behavioral and brain data. implications as well as its formal properties. 
'J'hc cycle between intuitive derivation and computational analysis goes on unt,il one finds 
the rnost parsirnonious and most predictive realization of the organizational principles that 
one ha.:-; already discovered. Through this analysis, one can <llso identify various of the 
"species .. specific variations" of such a. prototypical model, a.ncl apply them to difFerent. types 
of da.l.a. Such a. theoretical analysis also discloses the shape of the boundary, within the 
space of cla.ta, beyond which the model no longer has explanatory power. The shape of this 
boundary between the known and the unknown then often clarifies what design principles 
have been onritted from the previous analyses. 'fhc next step is to show how these additional 
design principle:-; can be incorporated into a more powerful rnodcl, which can explain even 
rnorc behavioraJ a.ncl neural d<lta. In this wa.y, the rnodel undergoes a. type of evolutionary 
clcveloprncnt, as it tries to cope behaviorally with environrnenta.l constraints of ever increasing 
subtlety ancl cornplexity. 
The rnetatheoretica.l constraint that comes into view here is an embedding con:-;traint; in 
other words, one needs to be able to embed the previous model into the new model. Otherwise 
expressed, the previous model needs to be "unlumpablc" as it evolves into a.n increasingly 
cornplex "brain". 'I' his is a type of col'J'espondence principle tha.t places a surprisingly sc-· 
vere test on the aclequa.cy of the previously discovered theoretical principles. Many rnodcl:o 
regularly fail the ernbeclcling constraint. That is why they come a.nd go with surprisingly 
rapidity, a.ncl do not get integrated into burgeoning theories of ever greater predictive power. 
'l'he crucial importm1ce of being able to derive behavioral mechanisms as emergent prop-
erties of real-time brain mechanisms, a.nd being able to embed a previous model into a more 
5 
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rnature model that is capable of adapting to more complex environments, led me to the name 
Embedding Fields for my earliest models of brain and behavior (Grossberg, 1964). The word 
"fields" is a short-hand for the neural network as a. cornputa.tional unit whose interactions 
generate behavioral emergent properties; the word "embedding" refers to the unlumpa.bility 
constraint. Ma.ny stages of model evolution have occurred since the mid-1960's and all of 
therr1 have successfully built a. foundation for their progeny. The present article will necessar· 
ily omit these modeling cycles and will instead discuss some of its results from the viewpoint 
of consciou::mess research. 
How Do We Perceive Illusory Contours and Brightness? 
Let me start by providing several examples of the diverse phenomena. that AHT clarifies. 
Consider the irnages in Figure l. Figure l a shows an image called an Ehren stein figure 
in which some radial black lines are drawn on a uniformly white paper. Remarkably, our 
minds construct a circular illusory contour that touches each line end at a perpendicular 
orientation. 'I'his illusory contour is a collective, emergent property of all the lines that only 
occurs when their positions relative to each other are suitable. For example, no illusory 
contour forms at the line ends in Figure 1 b even though they end at the same positions as 
the lines in Figure la. Note also that the illusory contour in Figure la surrounds a. disk that 
seems uniformly brighter tlran its surround. Where does the brightness enhancement corne 
frorn? 11; certainly does not always happen when illusory contours form, as can be seen by 
inspecting Figure lc. Here a vertical illusory contour can be recognized as interpolating the 
two sets of offset horizontal lines, even though neither side of the contour seems brighter 
than the other. How we can consciously rccogni;;:c sorncthing that we cannot sec, a.nd is 
thus perceptua.lly invisible, is a. fascinating aspect of our conscious awareness about which 
quite a bit is now known. Such percepts arc known as arnodal percepts (Ivlichottc, Thincs, 
and Crabbe, l9(H) in order to distinguish them from modal, or visible, percepts. Amodal 
percepts are experienced in response to rna.ny naturalistic scenes, notably in response to 
scenes in which sorne objects arc partially occluded by other objects. How both modal a.nd 
arnodal percepts can occur will be discussed below. Of particular interest from the viewpoint 
of AlTf processing is why the Ehrenstein disk looks bright, despite the fact that there a.rc 
no local contrasts within the image itseH that describe a disk-like objed. 
How Do We Learn to Recognize Visually Perceived Objects? 
'l'hc Ehrenstein example concerns Uw process of visual perception. 'fhc next exarnplc 
concerns a process that goes on at a higher level of the vi:mal system. lt is the process 
whereby we visually recognize objects. A key part of this pnJcess concerns how we learn to 
categorize specific instances of an object, or set of object;;, into a rnore general concept.. For 
exarnple, how do we learn that rnany different printed or script letter fonts can all repre-
sent the sarrw letter A? Or how do we learn that several different combinations of patient 
symptoms are all due to the same disease? Moreover, how do we control how general our 
categories will becorne? For sorne purposes, like recognizing a. particular face, we need highly 
;;peciiic categories. For others, like knowing that every person has a face, the categories a.rc 
much more general. Finally, how doeo our learning and memory break clown when something 
goes wrong in our bra.in? For exarnple, it is known that lesions to the human hippocam-
pal system ca.n cause a. form of amnesia whereby, arn.ong other properties, patients find it 
very hard to learn new information a.nd hard to remember recently learned information, but 
previously learned information about which their rn.emory has "consolidated" can readily be 
retrieved. T'hus, a.n amnesic patient can typically carry out a perfectly intelligent conver-
sation about experiences that occmTed a significant time before the lesion that caused the 
G 
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Figure 1. (A) The Ehrenstein pat tern generates a circular illusory contour that encloses a 
circula.r disk of enhanced illusory brightness. (B) If the endpoints of the Ehrenstein pati.ern 
remain fixed while their orientations arc tilted, then both the illusory contour and brightness 
vanish. (C) The offset pattern generates a vr)rt.ical boundary that can be recognized even 
though it cannot be seen. 
a,rnnesia. occurred. 
What computational properties do the phenomena. of bright illusory disks and arn.nesic 
memory have in contmon? I will suggest below that their apparent diffen)nces conceal the 
workings of a. general unifying principle. 
How Do We Solve the Cocktail Party Problem? 
To continue with our list, let us now consider a different modality entirely; namely, 
audition. When we talk to a. friend in a. crowded noi;;y roorn, we ca.n usually keep track 
of our conversation above the hubbub, even though the sounds emitted by the friendly 
voice nmy substantially overlap the oounds ernitted by other speaker;;. How do we separate 
thi;; jurn bled mixture of oounds into distinct voices? 'I'his is often called the cocktail party 
problem .. 'I'he same problmn is solved whcnevc~r we listen to a. symphony or other mnsic 
wherein overlapping harmonic cornponcnts are crnitted by :oevera.l instrument;;. If we could 
not separate the in;;trurnents or voices into distincL sources, or auditory streams, then we 
could not hear the music as rnusic, or int.elligcnt.ly recognize a speaker's sounds. A striking 
a.nd ubiquitous property of such percepts, and one which has not. yet been understand by 
alternative rnodcling approaches, is how future events can alter our con;;ciou;; percept;; of 
past events in a context-sen;;itive ntanner. 
i\ simple vcr;;ion of thio competence is illu;;tra.ted by the auditory continuity illusion 
(Bregman, 1990). Suppose that a steady tone shuts o!T' ju;ot a.s a broadband noise turns 
on. Suppooe, moreover, that the noise shuts off just as the tom~ turns on once again; see 
Figure 2A. When thi0 happens under appropriate condition;,;, the tone seems to continue 
right through the noise, which seems to occur in a separate auditory "stream". This example 
shows that the auditory system can actively extract tho;;e components of the noise tha.t a.re 
consistent with the tone and usc them. to track the "voice" of the tone right through the 
hubbub of the noi;;e. 
Tn order to appreciate how remarkable this property is, Jet us compare it with what 
7 
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Figure 2. (A) Auditory continuity illusion: When a steady tone occurs both before and 
after a burst of noise, then under appropriate temporal and amplitude conditions, the tone is 
perceived to continue through the noise. (B) 'I'his does not occur if the noise is not followed 
by a tone. 
happens when the tone does not turn on again for a second time, as in Figure 213. 'I'hen the 
first tone does not seern to continue through the noise. It is perceived to stop before the 
noise. How does the brain know that the second tone will tum on after the noise shuts off, 
so that it can continue the tone through th'~ noise, yet not continue the tone through the 
noise if the second tone docs not eventually occur? Does this not seerr1 to require that the 
brain can operate "badnva.rds in time" to alter its decision as to whether or not to continue 
a past tone through the noise based on future events? 
Many philosophers and scientists have puzzled about this sort of problem. I will argue 
that the process whereby we consciously hear the first tone takes some time to unfold, so 
that by the time we hear it, the second tone has a.lreacly begun. 'T'o make this argument, we 
need to ask why does conscious audition take so long to occur after the actual sound energy 
reaches our bra.in? Just as important, why can the second tone influence the conscious 
percept w quickly, given that the first tone could not? Finally, I will indicate what these 
auditory phenornena have to do with bright Ehrenstein dioks and amnesia. 
How Do We Consciously Perceive Speech? 
The !ina! exam pies also involve the auditory system, but at a higher level of processing. 
'J'hey concern how we underst.ancl speech. In these examples, too, the process whereby 
conscious awareness occurs takes a ion~ time, on the order of I 00 milliseconds or more. An 
analysis of these percepts will also gi~(, us rnorc clues about the nature of the underlying 
process. 'J'hc Jirst cxa.rnplc is called phonemic restoration. Suppose that a listener bears 
a. noise followed irnrncdiat.ely by the words "eel is on the ... ". If this string of words is 
followed by the word "orange", then "noise-eel" sounds like "peel". If the word "wagon" 
completes the sentence, then "noise-eel" sounds like "wheel". If the final word is "shoe", 
then "noise-eel" sounds like "heel". 
'I'his rnarvelous example, which was developed by Richard Warren and his colleagues 
8 
June 25, _/ 998 
List 
Categories 
(STM) 
Bottom-up 
adaptive 
filter (LTM) 
Items in working 
memory (STM) 
STM before 
Top-Down 
Matching 
• • • 
t t t 
• • 
(A) 
(B) 
Top-down 
expectations 
(LTM) 
STM after Jf\ ~op-Down 
"l \alch;ng 
• • • 
t t t 
Figure 3. (A) Auditory items acLivate S'I'M traces in a working memory, which send 
bottom-up signals towards a levl)l at which Jist categories, or chunks, are activated in S'I'lVl. 
'I'hcsc bott.orn-up signals are multiplied by learned L'I'M traces which influence the selection 
of t.hc list categories that are stored in STM. 'I'he list categories, in turn, activate J;I'M-
modulated top-down expectation signals that <tre matched against the active S'l'M pattern 
in working memory. (B) This matching process confirms and amplifies STM activations that 
arc supported by contiguous r;nvr traces, and suppresses those that are not. 
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rnore than twenty yea.rs ago (Warren, 1984; Warren and Sherman, 1974), vividly shows that 
the bottorn-up occurrence of the noise is not suflicient for us to hear it.. Somehow the sound 
that we expect to hear based upon our previous language experiences influences what we do 
hear, at least if the sentence is said quickly enough. As in the auditory continuity illusion, it 
would appear that the brain is working "backwards in time" to allow the meaning imparted 
by a later word to alter the sounds that we consciously perceive in an earlier word. 
I suggest. tha.t this happens because, as the individual words occur, they are stored 
tcrnporarily via S'I'M traces in a working memory. As the words are stored, they activate 
J:I'M traces which attempt to categorize the stored sound stream into farniliar language units 
like words at a higher processing level. These list categories, in turn, activate learned top-
down expectations that are matched against the contents of working memory to verify that 
the information expected frorn previous learning experiences is really there. 'I'his concept 
of bottom-up activation of learned categories by a. working memory, followed by read-out of 
learned top-clown expectations, is illustrated in Figure :JA. 
What is the nature of this rnatching, or verification, process? Its properties have been 
clarified by experiments of Arthur Samuel (Samuel, l98la., 1981 b) a.ncl others in which the 
spectral content of the noise was varied. If the noise includes all the formants of the expcctccl 
sound, then that is what the subject hears, and other spectral components of the noise are 
suppressed. If some formants of the expected sound are missing from the noise, then only a 
partial reconstruction is heard. If silence replaces the noise, then only silence is heard. 'I'he 
matching process thus cannot "create something out of nothing". U can, however, selectively 
amplify the coxpected features in the bottom-up signal and suppress the rest, as in Figure :m. 
'J'he process whereby the top-down expectation selectively amplifies sorne features while 
suppres;;ing others helps to "focus attention" upon information that matches our rnoJnentcrry 
expectations. 'I'his focusing process helps to Jilter out the flood of sensory signal;; that. would 
otherwise overwhelm us, and to prevent them frorn de;;tabilizing our previously learned rnem-
orics. Learned top-clown expectations hereby help to solve the Btability-pla.sticity clilernrna 
by focusing attention and preventing spuriou0 signals from acc:identa.Jly eroding our previ-
ously learned rncn1orieB. In fact, Gail Carpenter and l proved nw.thernatically in I 987 that 
such an AUT matching rule assures stable learning of an Altl' model in response to rapidly 
changing enviromnents wherein learning bccon1es unstable if the matching ru.le i0 rernoved 
(Carpenter and Grossberg, 1987a). 
What does a.ll thi0 have to do with our conscious percepts of speech? 'I'his can be seen by 
asking: If top-down expectations ca.n select consistent. bottorn--up BignalB, then what keeps 
the selected bottorn-up signals frorn reactivating their top-down cxpectcrtions in a continuing 
cycle of bottom-up and top-down feedback? Nothing does! In fact, this reciprocal feedback 
process takes awhile to equilibrate, and when it doe0, the bottom-up a.ncl top-clown signals 
lock t.he STM activity patterns of the interacting levels into a. resonant state that lasts much 
longer and iB more energetic than any individual activation. AHT hereby, suggests how 
only resonant states of the brain can achieve consciousness, and that. the time needed for a 
bot.Lorn-up/top··down resonance to develop helps to explain why a. conscious percept or an 
event. takes so long to occur after its bottom-up input is delivered. 
'I' he cxan1 ple of phon ernie re0toration a.Jso clarifies another key point. about the consciou0 
perception of speech. If noise precedes "eel is on the shoe", we hear and understand t.he 
meaning of the sentence "heel is on the shoe". If, however, noise is replaced by silence, we 
hear and understand the meaning of the sentence "eel iB on the shoe" which has a quite 
clifFcrcnt, a.nd rather disgusting, meaning. 'I'his example shows that the process of resonance 
binds together information about both meaning and phonetics. Meaning is not son1c higher·· 
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order process that is processed independently from the process of conscious phonetic hearing. 
Meaning and phonetics are bound together via resonant feedback into a. global emergent state 
in which the phonetics that we hear are linked to the meaning that we understand. 
ART Matching and Resonance: The Link Between Attention, Intention, and 
Consciousness 
Adaptive resonance theory claims that, in order to solve the stability-plasticity dilem-
nEt, only resonant states can drive new learning. That is why the theory is called a.da.ptive 
resonance theory. I will explain how this works rnore completely below. Before doing so, let 
rnc ernphasize some implications of the previous discussion that are worth reflecting about. 
'J'he first implication provides a. novel answer to why, as philosophers have asked for rnany 
years, humans are "intentional" beings who are always anticipating or planning their next 
behaviors and their expected consequences. AH:I' suggests that "stability implies intention-
ality''. That is, stable learning requires that we have expectations about the world that are 
continually matched against world data. Otherwise expressed, without stable learning, we 
could learn very litt.lc about the world. Having an active top-clown matching mechanisrn 
great.ly a.mpliJies the amount of information that we ca.n stably learn about the world. 'I'hus 
the rnecha.nisms which enable us to know a changing external world, through the usc of 
learned expectations, set the stage for achieving internal seH-a.wa.rencss. 
H. should be noted here that the word "intcntiorra.lity" is being used, at once, in two 
difl'crent senses. One sense concerns the role of expectations in the anticipation of events 
that may or may not occur. 'I'he second sense concerns the ability of expectations to read-
out planned :oequences of behaviors a.irned at achieving definite behavioral goals. The former 
sense will be ernpha.sizecl first; the latter towards the end of the article. My rna.in point in 
lurnping them together is that ARI' provides a. unified mechanistic perspective with which 
to rHHlerstand both uses of the word. 
'I.' he second irnplica.tion is that "intention implies attention and consciousness". That 
is, expectations sta.rt to focus attention on data worthy of learning, and these a.ttentiona.l 
foci are confirmed when the system as a whole incorporates tlrenr into resonant states that 
include~ (l cJa.irn) conscious sta.t.cs of rnind. 
lrnplicit in the concept of intentionality is the idea. that, we can get rendy to experience an 
cxpect,ed event so that, when it finally occurs, we can react to it rnorc quickly a.ncl vigorously, 
and until it occurs, we arc able to ignore other, less desired, events. 'l'his property is called 
prirning. It implies that, when a. top-down expectation is read-out in the absence of a. 
bottoni··UJl input, it can subliminally sensitize the cells tha.t would ordinarily respond to the 
bottonHlp input, but not actually fire thenr, while it suppresses cells whose activity is no!. 
expected. Correspondingly, the AHT matching rule computationa.lly realizes the following 
properties at any processing level where bottom-up and top-clown signals arc rnatchecl: 
• Bottom-Up Automatic Activation: A cell, or node, can becorne active enough to 
generate output signals if it receives a. large enough bottorn-up input, other things being 
equal. 
• Top-Down Priming: A cell can becornc sensitized, or subliminally active, and thus 
cannot generate output signals, if it receives only a large top··down expectation input.. 
Such a top-down priming signal prepares a. cell to react more quickly and vigorously to 
subsequent bottorn··Up input that matches the top-down prime . 
• Match: A cell ca.n become active if it receives large convergent bottom-up a.nd top-clown 
in puts. Such a matching process can generate enhanced activation as resonance takes 
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hold. 
• Mismatch: A cell is suppressed even if it receives a large bottom-up input if it also 
receives only a small, or zero, top-down expectation input. 
1 claim that this AHT matching rule and the resonance rule that it implies operate in 
all the examples that I have previously sketched, and do so to solve the stability-plasticity 
dilemma. All the examples are proposed to illustrate how we can continue to learn rapidly 
and stably about new experiences throughout life by matching bottom-up signa.! patterns 
from more peripheral to more central brain processing stages against top-clown signal pat-
terns from more central to more peripheral processing sta.ges. These top-down signals repre-
sent the brain's learned expectations of what the bottorn-up signal patterns :;houlcl be based 
upon past experience. The matching process is designed to reinforce and arnplify those 
cornbina.tions of features in the bottom-up pattern tha.t a.re consistent with the top-down 
expectations, a.nd to suppress those features that a.re inconsistent. This top-down rmttching 
step initiates the process whereby the brain selectively pays attention to experiences that 
it expects, binds them into coherent internal representations through resonant states, and 
incorporates them through learning into its knowledge about the world. 
Given that such a. resonant matching process occurs in the brain, how does the brain react 
when there is a. rnismatch situation? The AR'I' matching rule suggests that a big enough 
mismatch between a bottorn-up input and a top-clown expectation can rapidly attenuate 
activity a.t the matching level. 'I'his collapse of bottom-up activation can initiate a rapid 
rcseL of activity at both the rnatcbing level itself and a.t the subsequent levels that it feeds, 
thereby initiating a memory search for a more appropriate recognition category or creating 
a ne\v one. 
Resonant Dynamics During Speech Categorization 
Marry examples of such a. reset event occur during va.riable-ra.te speech perception. As one 
cxarn pic, consider how people hear corn binations of vowelo (V) and consonants (C) in V G CV 
sequences. Bruno Repp a.t Haskins Laboratories has studied perception of the sequences [ib] 
[ga] and fib] [ba] when the silence interval between the initial VC syllable a.rrd the tennirral 
CV syllable is varied (RepJl, I 980). 1f the silence interval is short enough, then [ib][ga] 
sounds like [iga] and [ib][ba] sounds like [iba]. Rcpp ran a. number of conditions, leading to 
the several data curves displayed in Figure 4. 'I'he rnain point for present purposes is that 
the transition from a. percept of [i ba] to one of [i b] [ba.] occurs after 100-150 milliseconds 
more silence than the transition from [iga] to [ib]- [ga]. One hundred milliseconds io a very 
long time relative to the tirnc scale at which individua.l neurons can be activated. Why is 
this shift so large? 
Ivly colleagues la.n Boa.rdrnan, Michael Cohen, and I have quantitatively simulated these 
data. using a model, called the ART'PHONE rnodel, of how a. resonant wave develops clue 
to botton)-up and top-clown signal exchanges between a. working memory that represents 
the incliviclua.l speech items and a list categorization network that groups them together 
into learned language units, or chunks (Grossberg, Boa.rdrnan, a.nd Cohen, 1997). We have 
shown how a mismatch between [g] and [b] rapidly resets the working memory if the silence 
between thcrn is short enough, thereby preventing the [b] sound from reaching resonance 
and consciousness, as in Figure 5. We have also shown bow the dcvcloprncnt of a previous 
resonance involving [b] carr resona.ntly fuse with a subsequent [b] sound to greatly extend tire 
perceived duration of [iba.] across a silence interval between [ib] and [ba]. Figure 6A illus-
trates this property by suggesting how the second presentation of [b] can quickly reactivate 
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Figure 4. 'I'hc left-hand cmvcs represent the probability, under several experimental con-
ditions, that the subject will hear [ib] [ga] rather than [iga]. The right-hand curves do the 
same for [ib]-[ba] rather than the fused percept [iba]. Note that the perception of [iba] can 
occur at a silence interval between [ib] and [ba] that is up to 150 milliseconds longer than the 
one that leads to the percept [iga] in:otead of [ib]-[ga]. (Data are reprinted with pennis:oion 
from B.H. Repp (1980), Haskins Laboratories Status Report on Speech Research, SR-61, 
1.51 165.) 
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Figure 5. (A) Response to a single stop, such as [b] or [g], with and without rec;onance. 
Supratbrcshold activation iB shaded. (B) Reset due to phonologic mismatch between [ib] 
and [ga]. 
the resormnce in response to the first presentation of [b] before the resonance stops. 'l'his 
phenornenon uses the property that it takes longer for the first presentation of [b] to reach 
resonance than it docs for the second presentation of [b] to influence the maintenance of this 
resoila.ncc. 
If, however, [ib] can fuse acro0s tinw with [ba], then how do we ever hear distinct [ib] [ba] 
sounds when the silence gets long enough? Much evidence suggests that after a resonance 
fully develops, it spontaneously collapses after awhile due to a habituative procesc; that goes 
on in the pathways that maintain the resonance via bottom-up and top-down signals. 'l'hus, 
if Uw silence is long enough for re;oonant. collap0e of [ib] to occur, then a di;otinguishablc [ba] 
resonance cmr subsequently develop and be heard, as in Figure 613. 
Such a ha.bituative process has also been used to explain rnany other data about percep-
tion, learning, and recognition, nota.bly data about the reset of visual, cognitive, or motor 
rc'prescntations in response to rapidly changing events. Relevant vi;oual data include proper-· 
ties of light adaptation, visual persistence, aftereffects, residual traces, and apparent rnotion 
(Carpenter and Grossberg, 1981; Francis and Grossberg, 1996a, 1996b; Francis, Grossberg, 
and IVJingolla, 1994). Abbott ei a/. (1997) have recently reported data from visual cortex 
tha.t they modeled using the sa.rnc habituative law that was used in all of these applications. 
At bottom, such a habituative law is predicted to be found so ubiquitously across brain 
systems because it helps to rapidly reset and rebalance neural circuits in response to rapidly 
changing input conditions, notably as part of a.n opponent process (Grossberg, 1980). 
'I'he Repp (1980) data illustrate the important fact. that the duration of a consciously 
perceived interval of silence is c;ensitive to the phonetic context into which the silence is 
placed. 'l'hese dat.a show that the phonetic context can generate a conscious percept. of 
continuous sound across 150 milliseconds of silence···· that ca.n be heard as silence in a different 
phonetic context. Our explanation of these data in terms of the ma.intenance of resonance 
in one case, but its rapid reset in another, is consistent with a simple, but revolutionary, 
definition of silence: Silence is a temporal discontinuity in the rate with which the auditory 
resonance evolves in time. Various other rnodcls of speech perception, having no concept. like 
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Figure 6. (A) Fusion in response to proximal similar phones. (B) Perceptual silence allows 
a 2-stop percept. 
resonance on which to build, cannot begin to explain data of this type. Several such rnodcls 
are reviewed in Grossberg, Boardman, and Cohen (1997). 
Resonant Dynamics During Auditory Streaming 
A sirnilar type of resonant processing helps to explain cocktail party separation or dis-
tinct voices into auditory streams, as in the auditory continuity illusion of Figure 2. 'l'his 
process goes on, however, at earlier stages of auditory processing than speech categoriza-
tion. lYiy colle<~gues J<rishna Govindarajan, Lonce Wyse, Michael Cohen, and I haveclevel-
opccl a rnoclcl, called the Aill'S'l'REAM model, of how distinguishabl(~ auditory strearns arc 
resonantly formed and separated (Grossberg, 1998b; Govindarajan, Grossberg, Wyse, and 
Cohen, 1995). Here the two main processing levelo (Figure 7) are a spectral strea.rn level 
at which the frequencies of the sound spectrum are represented across a spatial rnap, and 
a pitch stream level at which pitch nodes respond to the harmonics at the spectral strearn 
level that comprise a given pitch. After the auditory signal io preprocessed, its spectral, or 
frequency, conrponcnts arc redundantly represented in multiple spectral streams; that is, the 
oouncl's preprocessed frequency cornponcnts arc represented in multiple spatial maps, each 
one of which can su bservc the percept of a particular auditory stream .. 
Each of these opectral streams is filterccl by bottorn-up ;;ignals that activate its own pitch 
strca.rn representation at the pitch strca.rn level; that is, there are rnultiple pitch streams, one 
corresponding to every spectra.! strea.rn. 'fbis multiple representation of a. sound's spectral 
components and pitch interact to break up the entire sound stream that is entering the system 
into distinct acoustic sources or voices. 'I'his happens a.s follows. A given sound spectrum 
is rnultiply represented at a.ll the spectral streams and then redundantly activates all of the 
pitch nodes that are consistent with these sounds. 'I'hese pitch representa-tions cornpctc to 
select a. winner, which inhibits the representations of the same pitch across streams, while 
also sending top-clown matching signals back to the spectral strean1 level. By the AH1' 
nn.tching rule, the frequency components that are consistent with the winning pitch node 
are amplified, and all others a.re suppressed, thereby leading to a. spectral-pitch resonance 
within the stream of the winning pitch node. In tbis way, the pitch layer coherently binds 
together the harmonically related frequency components that correspond to a prescribed 
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auditory source. All the frequency components that are suppressed by AHT matching in 
this stream are freed to activate and resonate with a different pitch in a different stream. 
'I'hc net result is multiple resonances, each selectively grouping together into pitches those 
frequencie0 that correspond to distinct auditory wurces. 
Using the AHTSTREAM model, we have simulated rna.ny of basic streaming percepts, 
including the auditory continuity illusion of Figure 2. It occurs, I contend, because the 
spectral-stream resonance takes a. time to develop that i0 commen0ura.te to the duration of 
the su bsequcnt noise. Once the tone resonance develops, the second tone ca.n quickly act to 
support and maintain it throughout the duration of the noise, much a.s [ba] fuses with [ib] 
during perception of [iba]. Of course, for this to rnake sense, one needs to accept the fact 
that the tone resonance does not start to get consciously heard until just about when the 
second tone occurs. 
A Circuit for ART Matching 
Figure 7 incorporates one of the possible ways that Gail Carpenter a.nd 1 proposed in 
the mid-1980's for how the All'r matching rule can be realized (Carpenter and Grossberg, 
HJ87a). This matching circuit is redrawn in Figure 8 for clarity. lt is perhaps the sirnplest 
such circuit, a.nd I have found it in subsequent studies to be the one that is implicated by 
data tirne and time again. 
1n this circuit, bottom-up signals to the spectral stream level can excite their target 
nodes if top-down signals a.re not active. 'I'op-down signals try to excite those spectral, or 
frequency component, nodes that are consistent with the pitch node that activates them. By 
themselves, top-down signals fail to activate spectral nodes because the pitch node also ac-
tivates a. pitch surnnration layer that. nonspecifica.lly inhibits all spectral nodes in its sl;rea.rn. 
'J'hc nonspeciJic top--clown inhibition hereby prevents the spcciJic top-down excitation frorn 
supra.Jirnina.lly activating any spectral nodes. On the other hand, when excitatory bottom-
up and top-clown signals occur together, then those spectral nodes that receive both types 
of signals can be fully activated. All other nodes in tlra.t strea.m are inhibited, including 
spectral nodes that were previously activa.l,ccl by bottorn-up signals but received no subse-
quent top-clown pitch support. Attention hereby selectively activates consistent nodes while 
non selectively inhibiting all other nodes in a. strca.rn. 
Resonant Dynamics During Brightness Perception 
Having come this fa.r, Jet us review how ART' matching a.nd resonance help to explain tire 
enhanced brightness of the Ehrcnstcin disk in Figure la. This apparently simple percept has 
attracted a grea.t dca.l of attention from vision scientists because one could imagine many 
reasons why no brightness difference or the reverse brightness clilfcrence might have been 
seen instead . .John Kennedy (l<cnnedy, 1979, 1988) has attempted to explain this percept 
by positing that "brightness buttons" occur at the ends of dark (low luminance) lines. 'fhc 
textbook mechanism for cxpla.ining these brightness button;; has, in turn, for decades been 
an appeal to the on-center, off-surround receptive fields of early visual proce;;sing. A cell that 
possesses such a receptive field is excited by inputs near the cell's location (the on-center) 
but inhibited by inputs to more distant locations (the off-surround). 
An analysis of how such cells respond to da.rk lines shows, however, that they cannot, 
by themselves, explain brightness buttons. 1 show below why neither on-center off-surround 
cells (called ON cells below) nor off-center on-surround cells (called OFF cells below) can 
explain this phenomenon. Such ON and OFF cells occur in the lateral geniculate nucleus (or 
LGN), which is a waystation from the photosensitive retina. in the eye to the visual cortex. 
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Figure 8. One way to realize the AHT matching rule using top-down activation of non-
:;pcciiic inhibitory interncurons, as in Figure 8. Several mathematically posr>ible alternative 
wa.y:; arc r>uggestcd in the Appendix of G.A. Carpenter and S. Gros:;berg (l987a). 
'fhu:; the ON and OFF cells that occur in the LGN, and that arc the source of cortical 
brightness percepts, cannot explain brightness buttonr; without further processing. Figure 9 
:;bows that whatever contribution to area contra0t is generated at the ends of thin lines 
by ON or OFF cells mu;;t be less in magnitude than that generated along their sides. As 
explained below, thi:; should make the Ehrenstein disk appear darker, rather than brii;htcr, 
than its surround. -
'I'o :;ee why thi0 io w, assurne as in Figure 913 that thl) thin line is black (low lurninance) 
and surrounded by a white (high .luminance) background. Since OFF cells respond best to 
low lurninancc in their receptive fidel center and high luminance in their surround, OFF cells 
whose center;; lie inside the line will be activated. Furtherrnore, OFF cells ncar the line end 
(but ;;till in0icle the line) will be rnore strongly activated than OFF cells in the rniclcllc of the 
line, becau;;c the line end is rnore like a. black disk surrounded by a white background than 
the line rniddle i:; (Figure 9B). 'I'hat is, an OFF cell whose center lies in the line end receives 
lc;;:; inhibition frorn its surround than clews a. cell centered in the rniddle of the line, becau:;e 
a larger area of the former cell's surround lies in the white background. 
A similar analysis can be applied to the ON cells. An ON cell is excited by high luminance 
in the center of its receptive field and low luminance in its surround. The ON cells that arc 
active, then, arc those centered outside the bar. An ON cell whose center is just outside the 
side of the line will respond rnorc strongly tlmn a.n ON cell centered just outside the end of 
th0o line (Figure 9c). 
Given that LGN ON and OFF cells, by themselves, cannot explain brightness buttons, 
it still remains to explain how a brighter Ehrcnstein disk could be generated were brightness 
buttons to obtain. Clues were provided by John Kennedy, who analyzed a number of illusory 
contour stimuli. He argued that the effect of brightness buttons could often go unnoticed l'or 
isolated line segrnents, but could somehow be pooled and amplified in perceptual salience 
when several brightness buttons occurred in proximity or within a figurally complete region. 
Jn the rnid-1980's, I worked with several colleagues to develop an analysis and interpretation 
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Figure 9. Retinal center~surround cells and their optimal stimuli (A). 'l'he ON cell, on 
the left, responds best to a high lurninancc disk surrounded by a low luminance annulus. 
'J'lw OFF cell, on the right, responds best to a low luminance disk surrounded by a high 
lurninance annulus (B). OFF cells respond to the inside of a black line. 'T'hc OFF cell 
centered <rt the line end responds rnore strongly than the OFF cell centered in the middle, 
bccau;;c the surround region of the forrncr cell is closer to optirnal. ln (C) ON cells respond 
to the white background just outside the black line. 'fbe a.rnount of overlap of each ON cell's 
;;urrouncl with the black line affects the strength of the cell';; response. As seen in the ON 
cell's optima.] stimulus (C), the more of the surround that is stimulated by a. black region, 
the better the ON cell will respond. Thus, an ON cell centered just outside the side of the 
line will respond better than a cell centered just outside the end of the line, because more 
of the off~surround is activated at the end of the line than along its side. 
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of Kennedy's remarks by developing a neural model of visual boundary and surface repn> 
sentation (Cohen and Grossberg, 1984; Grossberg and Mingolla, 1985a, 1985b; Grossberg 
and 'l'odorovic, 1988). 
In this model, the crucial mechanistic support for perceptually noticeable brightness 
buttons is a boundary segmentation that separates the region containing the buttons frorn 
other regions of a scene. Such a boundary segmentation may be generated by image edges, 
textures, or shading, and ma.y give rise to illusory contours such a.s the Ehrenstein circle. 
We suggested how brightness buttons could, at a. later processing stage, activate a diffu-
sion process that could "fill-in" a uniform level of brightness within the bounding illusory 
contour. The model successfully explained and predicted many facts about illusory con-
tours and brightness percepts, arnong other phenomena, but it incorrectly predicted that 
the Ehrenstein disk should look darker than its surround. Given that so many brightness 
data had been correctly predicted by the model, including data collected aJter its publica-
tion, the question arose of how the rnoclel's description was incomplete or incorrect. Such 
an analysis was recently carried out with Alan Cove a.nd Ennio Mingolla. (Cove, Grossberg, 
and Mingolla, 1995). We showed how the addition of a feedback loop from the visual cortex 
to the LGN helps to expla,in brightness buttons without disturbing the model's previous 
explanations of other brightness phenomena.. 
'J'he gist of this analysis can be sumrna.rizecl as follows. Brightness buttons are by defini-
tion an effect of an oriented structure such as aline, or more generally a corner or sharp bend 
in a contour, on perceived brightness. Within the prior model, the computations leading to 
brightness perception were unoriented, in the sense that they were initiated by ON and OFF 
cdls with circularly symmetric receptive fields. How then could the effects of oriented filter·· 
ing be used to rnodulate the inputs to the process that produces brightness buttom;? Indeed, 
oriented filtering alone could not suffice. Interactions must exist arnong the oriented filters 
to determine the location of the ends of the lines, at which the brightness buttcms occur. !\ 
mttural candidate for the latter interactions is the cortical endst,opping process that has been 
known, since the Nobel-prize winning work of David Ilubel and 'fhorstein Wiesel, to convert 
cortical cornplcx cell;; into cndstoppcd cornplex, or hypcrcornplcx, cells (Hubel a.nd Wiesel, 
1977). T'hese oriented cells a.re selectively activated at and ncar the ends of lines. Where 
should the results of this enclstopped processing have their effect on brightness processing? 
Llaving cornc this far, it is plausible to propoc;c that the cortex influences LGN cells 
via totHiown feedback, which it is well known to do. 11. is not plau;;iblc, however, that. this 
rna.c;sive feedback pathway exists just to make Ehrensl;()in clisb appear brighi,! I had, however, 
earlier predicted that corticogeniculate feedback exists for a potentially important functional 
reason; nanrely, to cnha.nn~ the activity of LGN cells that support the adivity of presently 
active cortical cells, and to suppress the activity of LGN cells that do not (Grossberg, 
1CJ76a., l976b, 1980). In a.clclition, bottom-up retinal input, by itself, was hypothesized to 
supralim.inally activate LGN cells, but top-down corticogeniculate feedback, by itself, wa.s 
not. ln other words, corticogeniculatc fecclba,ck was predicted to realize an ART' matching 
and resonance rule in order to control and stabilize learned changes in cortical l:rM traces 
in response to the Hood of visual experience. 
Figure 10 surnmarizes how this type of corticogeniculate feedback can produce brightness 
bnttons. Figure 11H surnmarizcs a con1puter sim.ulation of brightness buttons. 'fire model's 
boundary cornplction network generates the circular illusory contour of Figure ll C. 'I' he 
brightness button activation pattern in Figure UB generatcc; a topographic input to a filling 
in domain, wherein the inputs diffuse freely in all directions until they hit a barrier to filling·· in 
that is irnposecl by the circular boundary signals in Figure llC. The result, is an Elrrenst.c~in 
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Figure 10. Schematic dia,gram of brightness button fonnation in the model. In (A) the 
distribution ol' model LGN cell activities prior to receiving any feedback, in response to 
a black bax is illustrated. Open circles code ON cell activity; filled circles code OFF cell 
activity. (B) shows the effect of feedback in bottom-up LGN activations. 'I'he pins (minus) 
signs designate the excitatory (inhibitory) top-down influence of an oriented enclst.oppcd 
cortical cell. (C) shows the LGN activity distribution after endstopped feedback, such as 
that in (B), combines with the direct efFect of ON and OFF cell processing, such as that in 
(A). A brightness button is formed outside both ends of the line. 
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disk with uniformly enhanced brightness relative to its surround in Figure llD. 
Is there direct experimental evidence that corticogeniculate feedback can alter LGN 
cell properties as desired? Murphy and Sillito (1987) showed that cortical feedback causes 
significant length-tuning in cat LGN cells. As in cortical endstopping, the response to a line 
grows rapidly as a function of line length and then abruptly declines for longer lines. T'hc 
response to long lines is hereby depressed. H.edies et. al. (1986) found that cat dorsal LGN 
cells and strongly endstopped cortical complex cells responded best at line ends. In other 
words, the response of the LGN cells to line ends was enhanced relative to the response to 
line sides. 
Is there direct expccrimentaJ evidence for tbc prediction that corticogeniculate feedback 
supports AH'I' matching and resonance? In a remarkable 1994 Nitture article, Sillito ancl 
his colleagues (Sillito et a.J., 1994) published neurophysiological data that strikingly support 
this prediction. 'I'bcy wrote in particular that "cortically induced correlation of relay cell 
activity produces coherent firing in those groups of relay cells with receptive field alignrncnts 
appropriate to signal the particular orientation of the moving contour to the cortex ... 
this increases the gain of the input for feature-linked events detected by the cortex ... the 
cortico-thalamic input is only strong enough to exert an effect on those clLGN cells that arc 
additiona.lly polarized by their retinal input ... the feedback circuit searches for correlations 
that support the 'hypothesis' represented by a particular pattern of cortical activity". In 
short, Sillito verified all the properties of the AH:r matching rule. 
How Early Does Attention Act in the Brain? 
If we take~ these results at face value, then it would appear that corticogcniculate feedback 
helps to "focus attention" upon expected patterns of LGN activity. However, it is typically 
argued that vi~ual attention first act;; at much higher levels of cortical organization, ~tarting 
with the cxtra.striate vi~ual cortex. Is there a contradiction here'~ 'l'bc answer depends 
upon how you define attention. H attention refers only to proccs~es that can be controlled 
voluntarily, then corticogenicnlatc feedback, being au(.ormltic, may not qualify. On the 
other hand, corticogcniculate feedback doeo appear to have the selective properties of an 
"autornatic" attention proce:;s. 
Attention at All Stages of Sensory and Cognitive Neocortex? 
It ha~, in fact, been suggc~ted how similar autonmtic attentiona.l processe0 arc integrated 
within the laminar circuits of vi;;ual cortex, notably the circuits of cortical area.:; Vl and V'2 
tha.t. are u;;cd to generate perceptual groupings, such as the illusory cont.ours in Figure J 
(Gros;;bcrg, l998a.). In this propo:;al, the AHT Matching Rule is realized a~ follows. 'fop-
clown aHentional feedback frorn cortical area V2 to V1 is predicted to be mediated by signals 
frorn layer 6 of cortical area. V2. These top-down signals a.ttentionally prirne layer tJ of cortical 
area Vl via an on-center off-~urround network within Vl frorn layer G to layer tJ. In this 
conception, layer 6 of V2 activates layer G of Vl, possibly via a multisynaptic pathway, which 
in turn activates layer 4 of V1 via an on-center off-surround network frorn layer () .. to-4·. This 
analy~i~ predicts that the layer 6-to-1 on-center off-surround circuit can moclula.t;e layer 4 
cells, but cannot fully activate thern, because. the top-down attentiona.l prime, acting by 
itself, is subliminal. Such a modulatory effect is achieved by appropriately balancing the 
strength of the on-center and off-surround signals within the layer 6-to-'1 network. 
Related modeling work has shown how such balanced on-center off..surround signals can 
lead to self-stabilizing development of the horizontal connections within layers 2j:l of VI and 
V2 that subscrve perceptual grouping (Grossberg and Williamson, 1997, 1998). It has also 
been shown bow the top-clown on-center off-surround circuit from area VI to LGN can self-
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Figure 11. (A) The Ehrenstcin ftgure. (B) 'I'he LGN stage response. Both ON and OFF cell 
activities are coded as rectified deflections from a neutral gray. Note the brightness buttons 
at the line ends. (C) The equilibrium boundaries. (D) In the filled-in surface brightness, the 
central disk contains larger activities than the background, corresponding to the perception 
of increased brightness. [Reprinted with permission from Cove, Grossberg, and lvlingolla, 
1995] . 
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stabilize the development of disparity-sensitive complex cells in area Vl (Grunewald and 
Grossberg, 1998). Other modeling work has suggested how a. similar top-down on-center 
off-surround automa.tica.l attentiona.l circuit from cortical area MS'I' to MT Cc1n be used to 
generate coherent representations of the direction and speed with which objects move (Chey, 
Cro0sberg, and Mingolla, 1997). Taken together, these studies show how the AHT Matching 
Rule rnay be realized in known cortical circuits, and how it can self-stabilize developrnent 
of theroe circuits as a precursor to itro role in self-stabilizing later learning throughout life. 
Grorosberg (1998a) has predicted that the same AHT matching circuit exists within the larrr-
inar organization that is found universally in all sensory and cognitive neocortex, including 
the various examples of auditory processing that are reviewed above. This prediction does 
not, of course, deny that these various circuits may be specialized in various ways to process 
the different types of information with which they arc confronted. 
Given (.hat the cortical organization of top-down on-center off-surround attentional prim-
ing circuits seem to be ubiquitous in visual cortex, and by extension in other types of cortex, 
it is important to ask: What more does the brain need to add in order to generate a rnorc 
flexible, task-dependent type of attention switching? This question leads us to our last cx-
arnple, that of visual object recognition, and how it breaks clown during media.! ternpora.l 
arnnesia. Various other models of object recognition, and their conceptual a.nd explanatory 
weaknesses relative to AHT, are reviewed in Grossberg and Merrill (1996). 
Self-Organizing Feature Maps for Learned Object Recognition 
Let. us begin with a two-level network tha.t illuotra.tes sorne of the mcl,in ideas in the 
sirnplcst possible way. Level F 1 in Figure 12 contains a network of nodes, or cell popula-
tions, each of which is activated by a particular combination of sensory fea,tmes via inputro. 
Level F2 contains a. network of nodes that rcpreoent recognition codes, or categories, which 
arc selectively activated by the activai;ion patterns across F 1. Ea.ch F.1 node sends output 
signals to a subroet of F2 nodes. Ea.ch F 2 node thus receives inputs from ma.ny F1 nodes. The 
thick bottom-up pathway from F 1 to F 2 in Figure 12 repret:ents in ct concise way an array of 
diverging and converging pathways. Let learning take place a.t the synapses denoted by scrni-
circular endings in the F 1 _, :h pathways. Pathways that end in arrowheads do not undergo 
learning. This bottom-up learning enables F2 category nodes to become selectively tuned to 
parcicula.r cornbina.tions of adivation pattcrnro acroros F1 feature detectors by changing their 
I ;rJVI traces. 
Why is not bottom··Up learning suflicicnt in a system that can autonon1m.1Siy solve the 
stability-plasticity dilemma? Why are learned top-down cxpectationro also nctrdecJ? 'J'o un-
derrotancl this, we cont:icler a type of rnodcl that iro often called a :;elf-organizing feature rna.p, 
competitive learning, or learned vector quantization. T'his type of rnodel shows how to 
cornbinc associative learning and la.tcra.l inhibition for purposes of lea.rnecl categorization. 
In such a model, as shown in Figure 13A, an input pattern registers itself as a pattern ol' 
activity, or S'I'M, across the feature cletector:o of kvcl F1 . Each .F1 output signal is rnult.iplicd 
or gated, by the adaptive weight, or LTM trace, in its respective pathway. All these l:l'M-
gatccl inputs are a.cldecl up at their target .F2 nodes. 'I'hc I:rM traces hereby fihcr the 
S'l'M. signa.! pattern and generate larger inputs to those F2 nodes whose I;rM patterns arc 
most sirnilar to the STM pattern. Lateral inhibitory, or competitive, interactions within 
:r2 contrast-enhance this input pattern. Whereas ma.ny F 2 nodes ma.y receive inputs from 
.F1 , lateral inhibition allows a much smaller set of F2 nodes to store their activation in 
S'I'M. 'I'hese are the F2 nodes whose I:I'M patterns are most similar to the S'I'M pattern. 
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Figure 12. An exarrrpk~ of a model AH:I' circuit in which attcntional and orienting circuits 
interact. Level F 1 encodes a distributed representation of an event by a. short term memory 
(S'J'M) activation pattern across a network of feature detectors. Level .'h encodes the event 
using a cornpressed S'I'IVl representation of the F 1 pattern. Learning of these recognition 
codes occurs a.t the long term rnernory (L'J'M) traces within the bot.tonHrp and top-down 
pathways between kvels F1 and .F2 . 'I'he top-down pathways read-out learned expectations 
whose prototypes are matched against bottom-up input patterns at .F1 . 'I'he size of mis· 
nra.tches in response to novel events arc evaluated relative to the vigilance parameter p of 
the orienting subsystem A. A large enough misrna.tch resets the recognition code that is 
active in STM at .F2 and initiates a rnenrory search for a rnore appropriate recognition code. 
Output from subsystcrn A ca.n a.lso trigger an orienting response. (A) Block diagram of cir-
cuit. (B) Individua.l pathways of circuit, including the input level Fo that generates inputs 
to level .F1. 'I'hc ga.in control input g1 to level :F1 helps to instantiate the matching rule (:::ee 
text). Gain contt:ol g2 to level F 2 is needed to instate a. category in STM. 
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Case I 
State of S i + 
-----·--·· 
State of x j + 
State of wij t 
+ = active 
- = inactive 
Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
-
+ 
t 
+ -
- -
~ ~ 
t = increase 
t = decrease 
~=no change 
Table l. 'l'he instar learning, or gated steepest descent learning rule, embodies both Heb-
bian (L'I'P) and anti-Hebbian (l:l'D) properties within a single process. (Reprinted with 
pennission frorn Grossberg and Merrill, 1996). 
'l'hese inhibitory interactions also tend to conserve the total activity that is stored in S'I'M 
(Grossberg, 1982), thereby rea.liz:ing an interference-based capacity limitation in S'J'M. 
Only the F 2 nodes that win the cornpctition and store their activity in S'l'M can influence 
the lcaming process. S'l'M activity opens a leaming gate at the L'l'M traces that abut the 
winning nodes. 'J'hesc J;rrvr traces can then approach, or track, the input signals in their 
pathways, a process called steepest descent. 'J'his learning law is Ums often c:allccl gated 
steepest descent, or instar learning. This type of learning tunes the winning L'I'M pattern;; 
to become even more sirnilar to the S'J'M pattcm, and to thereby enable the S'I'M pattern 
to rr1ore dfectively activate the corresponding F2 nodes. l introduced this learning law 
into neural network models in the 1960's (e.g. Grossberg, 1969), and into Alrl' rnodels in 
the 1970's (Grossberg, 1976a, l976b, 1978, 1980). Such an I:l'M trace can either increase 
(llebbian) or decrease (anti-Hebbian) to track the signa.ls in its pathway ('l'a.ble 1). It has 
bcc:n used to model neurophysiological data about learning in the hippocan1pus (also called 
long tenn potentiation and long term depression) and about adaptive tuning of cortical 
feature detectors during early visual development (Artola and Singer, 199:l; Levy, 1985, 
Levy and Desmond, 1985, Rauschecker am! Singer, 1979; Singer, l98:l), thereby lending 
support to An:r predictions that these systems would employ this type of learning. 
Self..organizing feature rnap rnoclcls were introduced and corrlputa.tiona.lly characterized 
by Christoph von dcr Malo burg and rnyoclf during the 1970's (Groos berg, 1972, I ~J76a .. 1978; 
von der Maloburg, 1973; Willshaw and Malsburg, l97G). 'I'hesc: rnoclels were subscqut:ntly 
applied and further developed by rna.ny authors, notably 'I'cuvo l<ohonen (Kohonen, 1984). 
They exhibit rna.ny useful properties, especially if not too many input patterns, or clusters 
of input patterns, perturb level :F1 relative to the nunrber of categorizing nodes in level F2. I 
proved that, under these sparse environrn.ental conditions, category learning is stable in the 
sense that its r;rM traces converge to fixed values as learning trials proceed. In addition, 
the J:l'M traces track the statistics of the environrncnt, arc sclf .. nonna.lizing, and oBcillate 
a rninimum number of times (Grossberg, J976a). Also, the category selection rule, like a 
Ba.yeoian classifier, tends to minimize error. I also proved, however, that under l!l'biinuy 
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environmental conditions, learning become:o unstable (Gros:oberg, 1976b). Such a. model 
could forget your parents' faces when it lea.rn:o a. new face. Although a. gradual switching 
off of plasticity can partially overcome this problem, such a mechanism cannot work in a. 
learning system whose plasticity is rnaintained throughout adulthood. 
This memory instability is due to basic properties of associative lea.rning and lateral 
inhibition, which are two processes that occur ubiquitously in the brain. An analysis of thi:o 
in:otability, together with data. about human and animal ca.tegoriY-a.t.ion, conditioning, and 
attention, led me to introduce AHT models to stabilize the memory of self·orga.niY-ing l'cature 
rna.p:o in response to a.n arbitrary stream of input patterns. 
How Does ART Stabilize Learning of a Self-Organizing Feature Map? 
How docs an ART' model prevent such instabilities from developing? A:o noted above, in 
an An:r rnodel, learning dom not occur when some winning F 2 activitic;; are :otorccl in S'l'l\11. 
Instead, activation of F2 nodes may be interpreted as "rna.kinp; a hypothesis" about an input 
at F 1. When F 2 is activated, it quickly generates an output pattern that is tran:ornittcd along 
the top·down adaptive pathways from F2 to F 1 . These top·down signals are multiplied in 
their respective pa.thwa.ys by r;rM traces at the semicircular synaptic knobs of Figure l3B. 
'l'he LJ'M.gatecl signals from all the active :Fz nodes are added to generate the total top·clown 
feedback pattern from F2 to F 1. It is this pattern that plays the role of a. learned expectation. 
Activation of this expectation rna.y be interpreted a:o "testing t.hc hypothcsi:o", or "reading 
out the prototype", of the active F 2 category. As shown in Figure I Jll, i\1\:f networks are 
designed to rnatch the "expected prototype" of the category against the bottonHrp input. 
pa.Leern, or exemplar, to F 1. Nodes that arc activated by this exemplar are suppressed if they 
do not correspond to large I:rM traces in the top.cJown prototype pattern. 'I'he resultant 
F 1 pattern encodes the cluster of input fcatmes that the network deems relevant to t.be 
hypothesis ba:ocd upon its past experience. 'I'his resultant activity pattern, ca.llccl X* in 
Figmc Llll, encodes the pattern ol' features to which the network "pays attention". 
lf the expectation i;; clo:oc enough to the input exernpla.r, then a ;;tate of reoonancc clr> 
vclops a.:o (.lre attcntional focus takes hold. 'I'be pattern X* of attended features reactivates 
the :F2 category Y which, in turn, reactivates X*. 'I'he network locks into a. resonant state 
l.lrroup;h a positive feedback loop that dynamically links, or binds, X* with Y. 'I'hc rcso· 
nancc binds spatially distributed features into either a stable equilibriunr or a synchronous 
oscillation, much like (.be synchronous feature binding in visual cortex that has rr)cently at· 
tractcd so rnuch intere:ot after the experiments of Reinhard Eckhorn, Wolf Singer, and their 
colleagues (Eckhom et al., 1988; Gray and Singer, 1989); also sec Grossberg and Grunewald 
(1997). 
ln ATU', the resonant state, rather than bottom--up activation, is predicted to drive 
the learning process. 'l'he resonant. state persists long enough, at a high enough activity 
leveL co activate chc slower learning processes in (.he l:J'i'v1 (.races. T'his helps to explain 
how Lire r;rNI traces can regu.la.tc the brain ':o fast. infonnation processing without necessarily 
learning about the :oignals that they process. 'I'hrougb rcoona.ncc as a mediating event, the 
cornbination of t,op·down matching and a.ttcntional focu:oing help:o to stabilize An:r learning 
and rnernory in response to an arbitrary input environment. 1'hc stabilizing properties of 
top· down matching may be one reason for the ubiquitous occurrence of reciprocal bottorrHrp 
a.ncl top·clown cortico·cortical and cortico·thala.mic interaction:o in the brain. 
How is the Generality of Knowledge Controlled? 
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Figure 13. An.:r search for a recognition code: (A) 'I'he input pattern I is instated across 
the feature detcdors at level F1 as a short term memory (S'I'M) activity pattern X. Input 
I also nonspecific:ally activates the orienting subsystem A; sec Figure 1. S'I'M pattern X 
is represented by the hatched pattern across F 1. Pattem X both inhibits A and generates 
the output pattern S. Patte.rn S is multiplied by long term memory (l:I'M) traces and 
added at :F2 nodes to fonn the input pattern T, which activates the S'l'M pattern Y acro:;s 
the recognition categories coded at level F 2 . (H) Pattern Y generates the top-down output 
pattern U which is multiplied by top-down I;J'iVl traces and added at F 1 nodco to form 
the prototype pattern V that encodes the learned expectation of the active F 2 nodeo. lf 
V rnioma,tches I at F 1, then a new S'I'M activity pattcm X* is generated at Fr. X*' is 
repre:;ented by the h;l.tched pattern. It includes the feature~> of I that are coniirrncd by V. 
lna.ctivated nodes corresponding to unconfirrned fcaturcc; of X are unhatched. 'l'he reduction 
in total S'I'M activity which oc(:urc; when X is tranoforrnecl into X* causes a decrcac;e in tlw 
total inhibition fronr'r1 to A. (C) If inhibition decreasero wflicieni.ly, A releases a nonspecific 
arouc;al wave to :F2 , which resets the STM pattern Y at F 2 . (D) After Y is inhibited, its top-
clown prototype signal is eliminated, and X can be reinstated at F 1. Enduring traces of the 
prior rec;et lead X to activate a different ST'M pattern Y* at F2. If the top-down prototype 
due to Y' a.lso misma.tchco I at F 1 , then the search for an appropriate F 2 code continues 
until a. more appropriate F2 representation is selected. Then a.n a.ttentivc resonance develops 
and learning of the attended data is initiated. [Reprinted with perrnission from Carpenter 
and Grossberg (199:l).] 
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A key problem about consciousness concerns what combinations of features or other 
inforrnation are bound together into object or event representations. AHT provides a new 
answer to this question that overcomes problems faced by earlier models. In particular, ARr 
systems learn prototypes, nether than exemplars, because the attended feature vector X', 
rather than the input exemplar itself, is learned. Both the bottom-up I:rM traces that tune 
the ca.tegory nodes ancl the top-down r;rM traces that filter the leamed expectation learn to 
correlate activation of :F2 nodes with the set of all a.ttencled X* vectors that they have ever 
experienced. 'I'hese attended STM vectors assign less S'I'M activity to fe<ctures in the input. 
vector I that rnisrnatch the learned top-down prototype V th<tn to features that m<ctch V. 
Given that ART' systems learn prototypes, how can they <tlso learn to recognize unique 
experiences, such as a particular view of a friend's face? The prototypes learned by Alii' 
systems accomplish this by realizing a qualitatively different concept. of prototype than that 
offered by previous models. In particular, Gail Carpenter and I have shown with our students 
how AH:r prototypes form in a way that is designed to conjointly maximize category gen-
erali:~,ation while rninimizing predictive error (Bradski and Grossberg, 1995; Carpenter and 
Grossberg, l987a, 1987b; Carpenter, Grossberg and Reynolds, 1991; Carpenter, Grossberg, 
Markuzon, Reynolds, and Rosen, 1992). As a result, AKl' prototypes can automatically learn 
individual exernplars when environmental conditions require highly selective discriminations 
to be made. How the rnatching process achieves this is discussed below. 
Before describing how this is achieved, let us note what happens if the rni:omatch between 
bottom-up and top-clown information is too great for a resonance to develop. Then the 
:F2 category is quickly reset and a memory search for a better category i:; initiated. 'fhis 
cornbination of top-down matching, attention focusing, and memory search is what stabilizes 
AHT learning and memory in an arbitrary input environment. 'I'hc a.ttcntional focusing by 
top-down rnatching prevent:; input:; that represent irrelevant features at :F1 from eroding the 
rncrnory of previously learned I:rM prototypes. In addition, the memory search resets :F2 
categories so quickly when their prototype V mismatches the input vector I that the more 
slowly va.rying l:I'M traces do not have an opportunity to correlate the attended .T1 activity 
vector X* with them. Conversely, the resonant event, when it docs occur, rnainta.ins and 
a.rnplifics the matched S'J'M activities for long enough and a.t high enough amplitudes for 
learning to occur in the J;l'M traces. 
Whether or not a. resonance occurs depends upon the level of rnisrnatch, or novelty, that 
the network is prepared to tolerate. Novelty is rncasurccl by how well a given exemplar 
rna.tches the prototype that its presentation evoke:;. 'I'he criterion of an acceptable match 
is clcflncd by an internally controlled parameter that Carpenter and 1 have called vigilance 
(Carpenter and Grossberg, 1987a). The vigilance parameter is cornputcd in the orienting 
subsystem A; sec Figure 12. Vigilance weighs how similar an input cxernplar I must be to a 
tOJHlown prototype V in order for resonance to occur. Resonance occurs if piii·-IX*'I :S 0. 
'fhis inequality says that. the :F1 attcntional focus X*' inhibit~; A more than the input I excites 
it. lf A rema.ins quiet, then an F 1 ,_, .T2 resonance can develop. 
Either a. larger value of p or a srnaller match ratio IX*IIII···l nra.kes it harder to satisfy 
the resonance inequality. When p grows so large or IX*IIII- 1 is so small that piii-IX*I > 0, 
then A generates an arousal burst, or novelty w<we, that resets the STM pattern across :F2 
and initiates a bout of hypothesis testing, or memory search. During search, the orienting 
:oubsystem interacts with the attentional snbsystenr (Figures 13C and 13D) to rapidly reset 
mismatched categories and to select better :F2 representations with which to categorize novel 
events at F 1, without risking unselcctivc forgetting of previous knowledge. Search may select 
'' farniliar category if its prototype is similar enough to the input to satisfy the resonance 
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criterion. 'fhc prototype may then be refined by attentional focusing. If the input is too 
different from any previously learned prototype, then an uncommitted population of :F2 cells 
is selected and learning of a. new category is initiated. 
Because vigilance ca.n va.ry across learning trials, recognition categories capable of encod-
ing widely differing degrees of generalization or a.bc:traction can be learned by a single AHT 
sy0tern. Low vigilance lea.ds to broad generalization a.ncl abstract prototypes. High vigilance 
leads to narrow generalization and to prototype;; that represent fewer input exemplars, even 
a single exemplar. Thus a single AHT system may be used, say, to learn abstract prototypec: 
with which to recognize abstract categories of faces and dogs, as well a.s "exemplar proto-
types" with which to recognize individual faces and clogs. A single system can learn both, as 
the need arises, by increasing vigilance just enough to activate A if a previous categorization 
leads to a predictive error. 'fhus the contents of a. conscious percept can be modified by 
cnvironn1entally sensitive vigilance control. 
Vigilance control hereby allows Altl.' to overcome some fundamental difficulties that have 
been faced by classical exemplar and prototype theories of learning and recognition. Classical 
exemplar models face a serious combinatorial explosion, since they need to suppose that all 
experienced exemplars are somehow stored in memory and searched during performance. 
Classical prototype theories face the problem that they find it hard to explain how individual 
c:xernplars are learned, such as a particular view of a familiar face. Vigilance control enables 
i\R'l' to achieve Uw best of both types of model, by selecting the inost genera.! category 
that is consistent with environmental feedback. If that category ic: an exernplar, then a 
"very vigilant" i\H'I' rnoclel can learn it. H the category is at an intcrrncdia.t.c level of 
genera1ization, then the i\HT model ca.n lea.rn it by ha,ving the vigilance value track the 
level of rnatch between the current exemplar and the prototype that it activates. In every 
instance, the model tries to learn the most general category that is consistent with the data. 
'I'his tendency can, for exarnple, lead to the) type of overgenerali~ation that is seen in young 
children unl.il further learning leads to category refinement ( Chaprnan ei al., 1986; Clark, 
1973; Srnit.h el; aJ., HJ85; Srnith and Kernler, 1978; Ward, 198:l). Many benchmark st.uclico of 
how AliT uses vigilance control to classify corn plex data. basco lra.vc Bhown that the number 
of AH.'I' categories tha.t io lea.rnccl scales well with the complexity of the input data; sec 
Carpenter and GroBsberg (1994) for a list of illustrative benchmark studies. 
Corticohippocampal Interactions and Medial Temporal Amnesia 
As c:equences of inputs arc practiced over learning triaJc:, the search process eventually 
convergec: upon stable categories. Carpenter and I rnathernatically proved (Carpenter ancl 
Gros;;berg, 1987a) that familiar inputs directly access the category whooe prototype providcc: 
the globally best match, while unfamiliar inputs engage the orienting subsystc:nr to trigger 
rnernory searches for better categories until they become familiar. 'I'his process continues 
until the rnemory capacity, which can be chosen arbitrarily large, is fully utilized. 'l'he 
process whereby search io autornatically disengaged is a form of mernory consolidation that 
crnerges frorn network interaction;;. Emergent consolidation does not preclude slructura.l 
conHolidation at individual cells, since the amplified and prolonged a.ct.ivilies that wbocrve a 
resonance rnay be a trigger for lcarning-clepenclent cellular processes, such as protein synthesis 
and transmitter production. It hac: also been shown that the adaptive weights which arc 
learned by an ARI' model at any stage of learning ca.n be tra.nsla.ted into IF-'I'HEN rules 
(e.g., Carpenter ei al., 1992). Thuo the Alrl' model is a. self-organizing rule-discovering 
production system as well as a. neura.l network. 
'fhe attentiona.l subsystem of AH:I' has been used to model aspects of inferotempora.l 
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(IT) cortex, and the orienting subsystem model;; part of the hippocampal system. The in-
terpreta.tion of AHT dynamic;; in terms of IT cortex led Miller.. Li, and Desimone (1991) 
to successfully test the prediction that cells in monkey IT cortex are reset after each trial 
in a working memory task. 'I'o illustrate the implications of an An:r interpretation of IT-
hippocampa.l interactions, I will review how a. lesion of the AH:I' model's orienting subsystem 
creates a formal memory disorder with symptoms much like the medial ternporal arnnesia 
that is caused in animals and human patients after hippocampal system lesions ( Carpen-
ter and Grossberg, 1994; Grossberg and Merrill, 1996). In particular, such a lesion .in vivo 
causes unlimited anterograde amnesia; limited retrograde amnesia; failure of consolidation; 
tendency to learn the first event in a series; abnormal reactions to novelty, including per-
severative reactions; normal priming; and normal information processing of familiar events 
(Cohen, 1984; Graf, Squire, and Mandler, 1984; Lynch, McGaugh, and Weinberger, I 981; 
Squire and Butters, 1984; Squire a.ncl Cohen, 1984; Warrington and Weiskra.ntz, 1974; Zola-
Morgan and Squire, !990). 
Unlirnitecl anterograde arnncsia occur;; because the network cannot carry out the mernory 
;;carch to learn a new recognition code. Lirnitecl retrograde arnne;;ia occurs because farniliar 
events can directly access conect recognition codes. Before events become fa.miliar, rncrnory 
con:;oliclation occurs which utilizes the orienting subsystem (Figure 13C). This failure of con-
solidation does not necessarily prevent learning per se. Int:tead, learning influences the first 
recognition category activated by bottom-up processing, much as amnesics arc particularly 
strongly wedded to the first response they learn. Persevera.tive reactions ca.n occur because 
the orienting sub:;ystern cannot reset sensory representations or top-clown expectations that 
rnay be persit:tently rnismatched by bottom-up cuet:. The inability to search memory prc-
ventt: Alrt' frorn di:;covering rnore appropriate stimulus combinations to attend. Normal 
prirning occuro because it is-mediated by the attentiona1 t:ubsystem. 
Similar behaviora.l problems have been identified in hippocampectomized monkeyo. Gaf-
J'an (1985) noted that fornix transection "irnpairs ability to change an established habit ... in 
a different set of circumstances that is sirnilar to the Jir:;t and therefore liable to be conJ'nsccl 
with it." In AH'l', a clefcctivc orienting subsystern prevent:; the rncrnory search whereby 
different representations could be learned for sirnilar events. Pribra.rn (J 986) called such a 
proce:;s a. "competence for recombinant context-:;en:;itive proces:;ing." 'l'besc Alrl' rnccha-
nisnr:; illu:;tral.e how, as Zola-Morgan a.ncl Squire (1990) have reported, memory consolidation 
and novelty detection may be mediated by the sarnc neural structures. Why hippocampec-
tornizecl rats have clifliculty orienting to novel cues and why there i:; a progre;;sive reduction 
in novelty--related hippocampal potentials a.:; learning proceeds in normal rat.s i:; also clarified 
(Dca.clwylcr, West, and Lunch, 1979; Deadwyler, West, and Robinson, 1981). In AH1', the 
orienting system is a.utomatically disengaged as events become familiar during the memory 
consolidation process. The An:r model of norrnal and abnorrnal recognition learning and 
rncmory is compared with several other recent rnodels of these phenomena in Grossberg and 
lVIerrill (1996). 
At this point, it might a.lso be useful to note that the processes of a.utornatic and Ursk-
sclcctive attention may not be independent in vivo. This is because higher-order attentional 
constraints, tha.t may be under task-selective control, can in principle propagate downwards 
through successive cortical levels via layer 6-to-la.yer 6 linkages. For example, recent modeling 
work ha:; sugge:;tecl how prestriate cortical areas rnay separate visual objects fronr one another 
and from their backgrounds dming the process of figure-ground separation (Grossberg, 19911, 
1997; Grossberg and McLoughlin, J 997). Such constraints may propagate top-clown towards 
earlier cortical levels, possibly even area. Vl, to rnodulate the cells that get active there to be 
consi:;tent with these figme-ground constraints. Still higher cortical prc)cest:es, such as those 
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involved in learned categorization, may also propagate their modulatory constraints to lower 
levels. How the strength of such top-down modulatory influences depends upon the source 
cortical area. and on the number of synaptic steps to the target cortical area. is a topic: that 
has yet to be systematically studied. 
How Universal are ART Processes in the Brain? 
In all the cxa.mples discussed above---from early vision, visual object recognition, audi-
tory streaming, and speech recognition -ART matching and resonance have played a. central 
role in models that help to explain how the brain stabili:;,es its learned adaptations in re-
sponse to changing environmental conditions. This type of matching can be achieved using 
a top-clown nonspecific inhibitory gain control that down-regulates all target cell;; except 
those that also receive top-clown specif1c excitatory signals, as in Figure 8. Are there yet 
other brain processes that utilize these mechanisms? 
John H.eynolds and collcague0 in Bob Desimone's laboratory (Reynolds, Nicholas, Chela-
z"i, and Dmirrrorw, 1995) have reported neurophysiological data frorrr cells in cortical areas 
\12 ancl \14 that a.re consistent with the AH1' a.ttentiona.lmcchanism sumrna.rizccl in Figure 8. 
Taken together with studies of the Vl ~ LGN attention circuit and of attentional control 
by frontal and inferotcmporal cortex during visual object recognition, it may be concluded 
that ART'- like top-down matching occurs throughout the bra.in'o visual sy0tcm. 
With rny colleagues Mario Aguilar, Dan Bullock, and Karen Roberts, a. neural model 
has been developed to explain how the superior colliculus learns to u0c visual, auditory, 
sorna.i,osensory, a.nd planned movement signal;; to control sa.ccaclic eye rnovernents (Grossberg, 
Roberts, Aguilar, and Bullock, 1997). This model uses ART' matching and resonance to help 
explain behavioral and neuml data about multirnoda.l eye movement control. The model 
clariJies how vioua.l, auditory, a.ncl planned movement oigna.ls use learning to form a mutually 
consistent movement map, and how attention gets focused on a. movement target location 
after all these signals c.onrpete to detenninc where the eyes will rnove. 
Recent experinrents frorn Marcus H.aichlc's lab at Washington University using positron 
emisc;ion tornography (PET) support the idea that ARJ' top-down priming abo occms in 
hurnan somatosensory cortex (Drevet0, Burton, ancl H.aichlc, 1995). In their cxperinrcnts, 
attending to an irnpending 0tirnulus to the fingers caused inhibition of nearly cortical cells 
that code l'or the face, but not cells that code the fingers. Likewise, prirning of tire toes 
produced inhibition of nearby ccl1s that code for tire fingers and face, but not ec;lls that code 
for Urc toes. 
AHT' rnodcl0 have alw been used to explain a great. deal of data. about. cognitive-·ernotional 
interaction;;, notably about cla.ssica.l and instrumental conditioning (Grossberg, 1987b) <rnd 
about hmnan decision making under risk (Grossberg and Gutowski, 1987). In theseexarnplcs, 
the rewnances are betwc;en cognitive and emotional circuits, and help to focu0 attention 
upon, and release actions towards, valued events in the world. 
'T'hus all levels of vision, visual object recognition, auditory streaming, speech recognition, 
attentive selection of eye rnovement targets, somato0ensory repre;;cnta.tion, and cognitive--
emotional interaction;; rnay all incorporate variants of the circuit depicted in Figure 8. 'I'hcse 
rc:sults suggest that a. type of "automatic" attention operates even a.t early levels of brain 
processing, such as the; lateral geniculate, but that higher processing levels benefit from an 
orienting subsystem. that can be used to flexibly reset. attention and to facilitate voluntary 
control of top-clown expectations. 
Internal Fantasy, Planned Movement, and Volitional Gating 
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Given this type of circuit, how could top-down priming be releasee! from inhibition to 
enable us to voluntarily experience internal thinking and fantasies? This can be achieved 
through an "act of will" that activates inhibitory cells which inhibit the nonspecific inhibitory 
interneurons in the top-down on-center off-surround network of Figure 8. This operation dis-
inhibits the cells receiving the excitatory top-down signals in the on-center of the network. 
'I'hese cells are then free to generate supraliminal resonances. Such self-initiated resonances 
can, for example, be initiated by the read-out of top-clown expectations from higher-order 
planning nodes into temporally organized working memories, say in the prefrontal cortex 
(Fuster, 1996). It is, for example, well-known that the basal ganglia. can use such a clisin-
hibitory action to ga.te the release of individual movements, sequences of movement:;, and 
even cognitive processes (1-likosaka., 1991; Middleton a.nd Strick, 199Ll; Sakai ei ill., 1998) 
'fhese examples a.lso help to understand how top-clown expectations can be used for the 
control of planned (viz., intentional) behavioral sequences. For example, once such planning 
nodes rea.cl-out their top-down expecta.tions into working memory, the contents of working 
memory can be rca.d-out and modified by on-line changes in "acts of will". 'I'hesc volitional 
signa.ls enable invaria.nt representations of a.n intentional behavior to rapidly acla.pt them-
selves to changing environmental conditions. F'or example, Bullock, Grossberg, and Mannes 
(I 99:l) have modeled how such a. working memory can control the intent.ional perfonna.nce 
of handwriting whose size and speed can be modified by acts of will, without a change of 
handwritten fonn. Bullock, Grossberg, a.ncl Guenther (1994) have shown how a visual t<i.rgel 
tha.t. is stored in working rnemory can be reached with a novel tool that has never been used 
before. 'T'he latter study shows how a such a model can learn its own parameters through a 
type of Pia.gctian perform-and-test developmental cycle. 
'I'hus we arrive at an emerging picture of how the adaptive brain works wherein the core 
issue of how a brain can learn quickly and stably about a changing world throughout life 
leads towards a rnechanistic understanding of attention, intention, thinking, fa.nta.sy, a.nd 
consciousness. 'fhe mediating events are adaptive resonances that effect a dynamic ba.la.nce 
between the cornplerncmtary demands of stability and plasticity, a.ncl of expectation and 
novelty, and which are a necessary condition for consciousness. 
What vs. Where: Why Are Not Procedural Memories Conscious? 
Although the type of All:l' rnatching, learning, and resonance that have been reviewed 
above secrn to occur in rnany sc,nr;ory and cognitive processes, they are not the only types of 
rnatching and learning to occur in the brain. In fact, there seenrs to be a major difference 
between the types of learning tha.t occur in sensory and cognitive processes versus those 
that occur in spatial and motor processes. ln pa.rticulax, sensory and cognitive processes are 
carried out in the 'vVha.t processing strearn that passes through the inferoternpora.l cortex, 
whereas spatial and rnotor processes arc carried out in the Where processing stream thai. 
passes through the pa.rieta.l cortex. What processing includes object recognition and event 
prediction. Where processing includes spatial navigation and motor control. I suggest that 
the typm; of matching and learning tha.t go on in the What and Where streams are different, 
indeed complementary, and that this difference is appropriate to their different roles. First 
consider how we use a sensory expectation. Suppose, for example, tha.t I a.sk you to "Look 
f'or the yellow ball, and if you find it within 300 msec., I will give you $1 ,000,000." H yon 
believed me, you could activate a sensory expectation of "yellow balls" that would rnake you 
rnucb more sensitive to yellow and round objects in your environment. As in An.:r matching, 
once you detected a yellow ba.ll, you could then react to it much rnorc quickly a.ncl with a. 
rnuch rnore energetic response tha.n if you were not looking for it. l.n other words, sensory 
and cognitive expectations lead to a type of excitatory matching. 
June 25, .1998 
Now consider how we usc a motor expectation. Such an expectation represents where we 
want to move (Bullock and Grossberg, 1988). For example, it could represent a desired po~ 
sition for the hand to pick up an object. Such a. motor expectation is matched against where 
the hand is now. After the hand actually moves to the desired position, no further movement. 
is required to satiofy the motor expectation. In this sense, motor expectations lead to a type 
of inhibitory matching. In summary, although the sensory and cognitive matching process 
is excitatory, the spatial and motor matching process is inhibitory. 'I'hese are cornplemc;n~ 
tary properties. Models such as ART quantify how excitatory matching is accomplished. 
A different type of model, called a Vector Associative Map, or YAM, model, suggests how 
inhibitory rnatching is accomplished (Gaudiano and Grossberg, HJ91; Grossberg, Guenther, 
Bullock, and Greve, 1993; Guenther, Bullock, Greve, and Grossberg, 1994). 
As shown in the discussions of Altr above, learning within the sensory and cognitive 
domain is often a type of match learning. It takes place only if there is a good enough match 
of top~down expectations with bottom~ up data to risk altering previously stored knowledge 
within the system, or it can trigger learning of a. new representation if a good enough match 
is not available. In contrast, learning within spatial a.nd motor processes, such a.s Vi\M 
processes, is misnwtch learning that is used to either learn new sensory~rnotor rna.ps (e.g., 
Grossberg, Guenther, Bullock, and Greve, 199:3) or to adjust the gains of sensory·rnotor 
conuna.nds (e.g., Fiala, Grossberg, and Bullock, 1996). 'I'hesc types of learning a.re also 
com plcrncnta.ry. 
Why are the types of learning that go into spatial and motor proces;;es complementary 
to those tha.t are used for sensory and cognitive processing? My answer is that An:r~ 
like learning allows the brain to solve~ the ;;tability~plasticity dilennna. It enables u;; to 
continue learning more about the world in a. stable fashion throughout life without forcing 
ca.ta.strophic forgetting of our previous memories. On the other hand, catastrophic forgetting 
is a. good property when it take;; place during spatial and motor learning. We have no need 
to remember all the spatial and motor maps that we used when we were infants or children. 
In fact, those maps would cause us a lot of trouble if they were used to control our adult 
lirnbs. We want onr spatial and motor processes to continuously a.da.pt to changes in our 
motor apparatus. 'I'hese complcrnentary types of learning allow our sensory and cognitive 
:;ystcrn:; to stably lcea.rn about the world a.nd to thereby be able to effectively control spatial 
;rncl rnotor proccs:;cs tha.t continually update themselves to deal with changing conditions in 
our lirnbs. 
"lhy, then, are procedural rnc:nwries unconscious? 'J'hc cliffcrcncc between cognitive 
rnemories and procedural, or rnotor, memories has gone by a. nurnbcr of different name:,;, 
including the distinction between declarative rnemory and procedural mernory, knowing that 
and knowing how, rnernory and habit, or memory with record and rnernory without record 
(Bruner, 1969; Miskin, 1982, 199:l; Rylc, UJt19; Squire and Cohen, 1984). 'I'he arnncsic 
patient JIM clra.rnatically illustrated this distinction by learning and rcrncmbcring rnotor 
skills like a.sscrnbly of the 'I'ower of Hanoi without being able to recall ever having clone 
so (Bruner, 1969; Scoville and Milner, 1957; Squire and Cohen, 1984). We can now give 
a very short answer to the question of why procedural memories arc unconscious: 'I'hc 
matching tha.t takes pla.ce during spatial and motor processing is often inhibitory rna.tching. 
Such a matching process cannot support an excitatory resonance. Hence, it cannot support 
consciousness. 
In this regard, Goodale and Milner (1992) have described a patient whose brain lesion 
has prevented accurate visual discrimination of object orientation, yet whose visually guided 
reaching behaviors toward:; objects are oriented and sized correctly. We have shown, in a 
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series of articles, how head-centered and body-centered representations of an object's spatial 
location and orientation may be learned and used to control reaches of the hand-arm system 
that can continuously adapt themselves to changes in the sensory and motor apparatus 
that is used to plan and execute reaching behaviors (Bullock, Grossberg, and Guenther, 
1993; Carpenter, Grossberg, and Lesher, 1998; Gaucliano and Grossberg, 1991; Grossberg, 
Guenther, Bullock, and Greve, 1993; Guenther, Bullock, Greve, and Grossberg, 1994). None 
of these model circuits has resonant loops; hence, they do not support consciousness. 
When these rnodels arc combined into a more comprehensive systern architecture for 
intelligent behavior, the sensory and cognitive match-based networks in the What processing 
stream through the inferoternporaJ cortex provide self-stabilizing representations with which 
to continually learn more about the world without undergoing catastrophic forgetting, while 
the Where/How processing Btream's spatial and motor mismatch-based maps and gains can 
continually forget their old parameters in order to instate the new parameters that are needed 
to control our bodies in their present form. This larger architecture illustrates how circuitB 
in the self-stabilizing match-based sensory and cognitive parts of the brain can resonate into 
consciousness, even while they arc helping to din;et the contextually appropriate activation 
of spatia.! a.nd motor circuits that cannot. 
Some Comments About Amodal and Modal Visual Percepts 
'l'bcre are rnany other aspects of perception and cognition, notably of vision and visual 
object recognition, which ca.n be discussed in the light of recent modeling advances to shed 
light on consciousness. Here I make some summarizing remarks whose cleta.ilecl analysis 
and justification can be found in the original articles. One issue of interest concerns the 
distinction between n:wcla.J a.ncl amoclal percepts. An amoda.l percept, such as the percept 
of a vertical boundary between the offset grating in Figure lC, is one which does not carry 
a. visible perceptual sign. As noted above, it. C<Ul be recognized without being seen; we 
are consciouB of it even though it is perceptually invisible. A modal percept, such as a 
percept of brightness or color, does carry a visible perceptual sign. 1 believe that all theories 
of consciousneBB need to deal with how amodal perccptB can occur because such percepts 
sharply distinguish between our consciously "knowing" that an event has occurred even 
though we clo not consciously "perceive" it. 
'l'he FACADE theory of biological vision has provided an extensive analyBiB of sornc of the 
cundit.ionc; t.ha.t cletennine whether a percept will be rnodal or a.rnodal (e.g., Grossberg, 199tl, 
1997; C:rossbcrg and McLoughlin, I 997; Cross berg and Mingolla, 1985; Francis, Grossberg, 
and l\llingolla., J 9~J!I; Gove, Grossberg, and Mingolla, 1995). A key contribution of this theory 
is to suggest how visual c;ccncs arc procec;sed in parallel by cortical boundary and surface 
systems, which are proposed to be rca1i~ccl by the intcrblob ancl blob processing strcarns 
from the LGN to cortical area V1. Boundaries include illusory contourB (Figure 1), as well 
as the boundaries that arc forrnecl in response to texture, shading, and stereo cues. 
A key insight of thiB theory is that "all boundaries are invisible" (i.e., anrodal) within 
the boundary processing Btrcarn, and that visibility iB a property of the surface processing 
strea.rn. Boundaries are invisible within the boundary processing strcarn because like-oriented 
signals from cortical sirnple cells that are sensitive to opposite contrast polarities are pooled 
at complex cells. Complex cells can hereby respond to contrasts that are either dark/light 
or light/clark, as cm1 all subsequent stages of the boundary system. Ao a result of this 
pooling process, a boundary can be formed around an object whose relative contrasts with 
reBpect to its background may reverse along its perimeter. A secondary consequence is that 
a perceptual boundary, by pooling acroe>s opposite contrae>t polarities (as well as a.ll opponent 
colors), cannot reprec;ent any visible property that clepcrrclc: upon knowing the direction of a 
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brightness or color change. 
Modal percepts are predicted to occur within the surface processing stream. Surface 
representations arise through interactions with the boundaries. First, the surface stream 
"discounts the illuminant", or compensates for variable illumination (Helmholtz, 1962, Land, 
1977, 1986). 'I'his discounting process eliminates brightness or color signa.ls within homoge-
neously bright or colored regions of a. scene, which could otherwise cause serious confusions 
between variable lighting conditions and the surface properties of objects in the world. Al 
subsequent processing stages, the boundaries interact with the discounted surface signals. 
Here, the boundaries suppress surface signals tha.t a.re not spatially coincident with them. 
Boundaxics select surface signals that are spatially coincident with them and initiate a pro-
cess of filling-in whereby these selected signa.ls can diffuse within the controlling boundaries. 
FACADE Theory predicts that the boundaries which exercise this control occur subse-
quent to the cortical processing stage at which visual inputs from both eyes are binocularly 
fused. It was suggested in Grossberg (l987a.) that, a.Hbough the binocular matching process 
is initiated in cortical area Vl, the stage at which the binocular boundaries are completed 
occurs no earlier than cortical area V2. 
During binocular rivalry, the inputs to the two eyes are mismatched in such a way that 
irna.ge regions from only one eye at a time can be consciously perceived. FACADE theory 
suggests how boundary signals from the two eyes compete in a. cyclical fashion through time, 
with the bounda.ric;; frorn one eye winning a.t any tirne in ead1 position. Such mrnpetilion has 
been traced to the rnechanisnro whereby a. winning boundary is selected from among rna.ny 
possible boundary groupings, even when the inputs to both eyes represent the same scene. 
'J'be cyclicity of the percept was traced to the habituativc mechanisms whereby boundaries 
are rapidly reset in response to rapidly changing imagery in order to prevent thcnr frorn 
persisting too long (sec Francis, Grossberg, and Mingolla (1994) for an ana.lyois of how 
long perceptual boundaries do persist). 'fben the winning boundaries select those surface 
signals from the dornina.nt eye which are spatially coincident with thern while suppressing the 
spatially discordant surface signals frorn the losing eye. 'l'lre First stage of such surface capture 
selects the surface properties frorn each eye separately. 'l'he selected surface representations 
are predicted to be anr.odaJ. 'l'hese selected surface properties are then binocularly matched 
at a subsequent processing stage at which the modal, or visible, surface representation is 
predicted to fornr. T'his is also the processing stage at which visual figure's arc fully sc:paratccl 
from one a.noUrer and frorn their backgronnds. 
c;ro:,;sbcrg (1987a) prc;clicted that this binocular moclir.l, or visible, representation of tire 
winning surface percept arises in cortical area \14, which resonate:,; with inferotcrnpora.l cortex 
during consciousness. LogoUlCtis ci al. (1996) have reported consistent cla,ta on binocular 
rivalry from awake behaving monkeys. Schiller (HJ94) has reported data from awake behaving 
rnonkeys that is consistent with the prediction tha.t figure-ground separation is completed in 
cort i ca.! area V 4 . 
'J'hesc results support the FACADE t.heory prediction that ilmodiil percepts may forrn 
in cortical areas \12 or before, a.ncl that moda.l representations of surfaces rnay first occur in 
cortical a.rea. \14. In further support of this hypothesiB, Grossberg (Hl9!J) explained many 
data. about 3-D figure-ground separation in which, sa.y, amodal representations of occluded 
object parts ma.y be formed in cortical area \12, and used to recognize these occluded objects, 
even though they are not seen. Modal representations of both occluding objects a.nd iJw 
unoccluded paJts of the objects that they occlude ma.y not be formed until cortical area ViJ. 
'I'his is proposed despite the fact that all of these cortical processing stages rna.y incorporate 
the Air!' IVJa.tching Rule within their laminar circuits, and may resonate using both the 
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intcrcortical and intracortical feedback pathways that activate the layer 6--to-4 on-center oJT-
:;urround networks, the former during attentional priming, and the latter during the selection 
of winning perceptual groupings. · · 
Grossberg (1997) proposed that the modally-conscious surface representations in \14 
rnay be used to recognize and to control reaching towards physically accessible objects, 
especially in infants, whereas the amodally-conscious representations· both of boundaries 
and of surfaces--in \12 may be used to recognize partially occluded objects and to reach 
towards them via. more indirect motor planning and control circuits. 'I'his proposal provides 
a functional reason for making some visual representations visible and others not visible; 
in particular, being able to distinguish between modal (e.g., occluding) and arnodal (e.g., 
occluclecl) representations helps to prevent eJTorts to reach through an occluding object to the 
object that it is occluding. On the other hand, the proposal does not expla.in how the property 
of visibility is achieved by one type of representation but not the other, particularly since 
both types of representation may be assumed to be resonant. This fact does not contradict 
the hypothesis that all conscious states are resonant sta.tes. It does show, however, that 
further mecha.nisrns are needed to explain why some of these resonant representations arc 
mocla.l w her cas others are merely amoda.l. 
'fhe need for further mecha.nisrns is well-illustrated by the following modeling predic-
tion. It was predicted in Grossberg (1987a.), and then used extensively to explain much 
more pr:rceptual data in Grossberg (199~, 1997), that a network of double-opponent cells 
fonm an irnporta.nt rnecha.nisrn in the process whereby boundaries select only those surface 
brightness and color signal;; that are spatially coincident with them. DoubJc .. opponent cells 
are often cited as a. key nwchani0m of color perception (e.g., Li vingstonc a.nd H u bel, 1984). 
FACADE theory suggests that such networks are used to fonn both amodal '1nd rnodal sur-
face representations. In the amoda.l smfa.cc representations, double .. opponent networks arc 
predicted not to gcncn1te a percept of visible color! Sornc other factor must be sought, to 
who0e clit>covery future research would be profitably directed. 
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